La Mauritanie à la veille des élections de 2019

Auteur : Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)

Date de publication : mai 2018

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Environnement géopolitique et sécuritaire

Depuis le début de la décennie 2000, le terrorisme algérien a débordé sur ses voisins du Sud. Le Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC), devenu AQMI en 2006, a en effet établi des bases dans le Nord du Mali à partir desquelles il a frappé le Sahel. De nombreux combattants sahéliens sont venus rejoindre cette structure dont l’encadrement est très majoritairement resté algérien. Entre 2005 et 2011, le territoire mauritanien a été à de nombreuses reprises frappé par ce groupe, ciblant surtout les forces de l’ordre mauritaniennes et les Occidentaux.

Même les opposants les plus convaincus du président mauritanien admettent que, durant ses deux mandats, il a efficacement réorganisé les services de sécurité et qu’il a remis à niveau l’armée, en augmentant les soldes, les budgets d’équipement et en créant et déployant fin 2009, tout le long de la frontière orientale du pays, des Groupements spéciaux d’intervention, unités mobiles et aguerries qui se sont peu à peu révélées indispensables dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.

Parallèlement, une amélioration de la collecte de renseignements, ainsi que la mise en place d’une zone militaire (dite « zone d’exclusion ») et un renforcement du nombre de postes frontaliers ont contribué également à prévenir les incursions des salafistes djihadistes sur le territoire. Ainsi, la Mauritanie n’a pas eu à déplorer d’actes terroristes sur son territoire depuis février 2011. Ce succès a fortement crédibilisé M.O.Abdel Aziz, tant le sur plan intérieur qu’aux yeux de la communauté internationale. Le chef d’État mauritanien bénéficiant de cette rente sécuritaire, la communauté internationale a mis sous le boisseau ses critiques vis-à-vis de sa gouvernance, ne voulant pas égratigner un « maillon fort » du Sahel.

Du reste, le président a acquis une véritable dimension internationale, grâce à ses succès sécuritaires, mais aussi à la présidence de l’Union africaine qu’il a exercée de janvier 2014 à janvier 2015. Il a de plus été l’un des principaux moteurs de la coopération sécuritaire régionale, notamment du Processus de Nouakchott et de la création du G5 Sahel, une organisation regroupant, outre la Mauritanie, le Mali, le Burkina Faso, le Niger et le Tchad. C’est une structure de développement qui a la particularité d’avoir un bras armé. En effet, l’un des principes cardinaux de l’organisation est d’améliorer la coopération pour une meilleure gestion des espaces frontaliers.

Parallèlement, une amélioration de la collecte de renseignements, ainsi que la mise en place d’une zone militaire (dite « zone d’exclusion ») et un renforcement du nombre de postes frontaliers ont contribué également à prévenir les incursions des salafistes djihadistes sur le territoire

En 2017 était créée la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel, dont le quartier général est à Sévaré (Mali) et qui est censée, notamment, combattre les terroristes dans le centre du Mali et le Nord du Burkina Faso. Cette force est programmée pour suppléer, et peut-être demain remplacer, les dispositifs sécuritaires de la communauté internationale (Minusma et opération « Barkhane ») déployés aujourd’hui.

Cependant, ces indéniables résultats du président mauritanien sur le front sécuritaire sont ternis par une diplomatie plus balbutiante et notamment par des relations notoirement délicates avec ses principaux voisins. Durant ses deux mandats, les tensions ont été palpables notamment avec le Maroc. Le rapprochement actuel du royaume chérifien avec la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) contraint la Mauritanie de se rapprocher de cette organisation régionale africaine qu’elle a pourtant quittée en 2000 en raison du lobbying des courants nationalistes arabes mauritaniens (baathistes et nasseristes) qui souhaitaient arrimer plus solidement le pays au Maghreb et prendre leurs distances avec l’Afrique de l’Ouest.

 Le président a acquis une véritable dimension internationale, grâce à ses succès sécuritaires, mais aussi à la présidence de l’Union africaine qu’il a exercée de janvier 2014 à janvier 2015. Il a de plus été l’un des principaux moteurs de la coopération sécuritaire régionale, notamment du Processus de Nouakchott et de la création du G5 Sahel

Avec le Sénégal, les points de friction sont très nombreux (question des pêcheurs sénégalais en Mauritanie, divergences sur la gestion de la crise gambienne début 2017, question de la facilité avec laquelle, selon Nouakchott, des opposants mauritaniens accèdent aux médias sénégalais…). Et la gestion commune des futures ressources gazières, qui est évidemment une chance, porte également certaines incertitudes. Les relations avec le Mali sont encore plus mauvaises.

Ces indéniables résultats du président mauritanien sur le front sécuritaire sont ternis par une diplomatie plus balbutiante et notamment par des relations notoirement délicates avec ses principaux voisins

La coopération sécuritaire entre les deux pays a été teintée de méfiance. Pendant de nombreuses années (entre 2005 et 2011 en particulier), la Mauritanie a soupçonné les autorités maliennes d’avoir passé un pacte de non-agression avec AQMI, constatant que bien qu’installé au Nord-Mali, le groupe terroriste épargnait ce pays pour concentrer ses attaques sur le Niger et la Mauritanie. Aujourd’hui, le Mali reproche à Nouakchott d’avoir été complaisant avec les mouvements autonomistes/indépendantistes du Nord-Mali, et en particulier avec le Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad.

 

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Mauritanie : pour lutter contre le terrorisme, le pays mise sur tous les fronts

Auteur : Jeune Afrique

Date de publication : 04 décembre 2015

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Quelle est la recette de la Mauritanie pour empêcher depuis février 2011 – et l’échec d’un attentat à la voiture piégée à Nouakchott – toute action terroriste sur son sol ? Une question que se posent ses voisins et à laquelle une conférence donnée en 2013 par le colonel Brahim Vall Ould Cheibani, alors chef du troisième bureau à l’état-major des armées, aujourd’hui directeur du projet « École supérieure des sciences de la guerre », apporte des éléments de réponse.

« Loin de se limiter à l’aspect purement coercitif de la lutte contre le terrorisme, l’approche mauritanienne est multidirectionnelle, préventive et répressive, expliquait-il. Elle a ratissé large en prenant en compte tous les autres corollaires qui abritent ou alimentent directement ou indirectement l’activité des terroristes – trafics, criminalité organisée transnationale. »

L’armée, que certains jugeaient composée de va-nu-pieds peu combatifs, a reçu les moyens (véhicules, carburant, armements et munitions) et la formation qui lui faisaient défaut. Le budget des armées a été augmenté et devrait plus que doubler l’an prochain, passant de 3 à 7 milliards d’ouguiyas (de 9 à 20 millions d’euros environ). Des zones militaires et 35 points de passage obligés ont été institués. De purement défensives, les opérations sont devenues offensives, et les forces mauritaniennes se sont projetées loin en territoire malien pour détruire bandes de trafiquants et bases de l’organisation Aqmi (en forêt de Ouagadou notamment) grâce à un système de renseignement efficace.

Loin de se limiter à l’aspect purement coercitif de la lutte contre le terrorisme, l’approche mauritanienne est multidirectionnelle, préventive et répressive

Mais la guerre est d’abord idéologique. Elle a été engagée avec le concours « d’érudits et de savants religieux de renommée internationale pour réconcilier le citoyen avec le vrai islam, discréditer les terroristes aux yeux des populations en démontant leurs thèses », assure le colonel. Parmi les mesures prises, citons des débats entre imams et terroristes, la création d’une radio du Coran, le recrutement de centaines d’élèves d’écoles coraniques pour les soustraire à la propagande extrémiste.

Dans le domaine social, de nouvelles moughataas (départements) ont été créées dans les zones isolées qui servent de repaire aux terroristes, afin de procurer à la population les services de base que ceux-ci prétendaient lui offrir. « Cela a contribué à les priver de certaines bases arrières où ils recrutaient », souligne Brahim Vall Ould Cheibani.

L’armée, que certains jugeaient composée de va-nu-pieds peu combatifs, a reçu les moyens (véhicules, carburant, armements et munitions) et la formation qui lui faisaient défaut. Le budget des armées a été augmenté et devrait plus que doubler l’an prochain, passant de 3 à 7 milliards d’ouguiyas (de 9 à 20 millions d’euros environ)

Le bilan est éloquent : depuis 2010, toutes les tentatives terroristes ont été mises en échec. « Plus de 60 % des terroristes se sont repentis, et des programmes ont été engagés pour leur réinsertion dans la vie civile », conclut le colonel, qui se félicite que ces diverses mesures aient « porté la peur chez l’adversaire ».

 

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Mauritanie : l’écrasement des opposants au nom de la lutte antiterroriste

Auteur : Candy Ofime, chercheuse sur la Mauritanie pour Human Rights Watch

Date de publication : 28 juin 2018

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Les 2 et 3 juillet, Emmanuel Macron sera en Mauritanie pour le sommet de l’Union africaine, puis en visite officielle. C’est la première fois, depuis 1997, qu’un président français en exercice se rend dans ce pays sahélien. A un an de l’élection présidentielle mauritanienne, nul doute que le parti au pouvoir saura tirer un profit politique de cette visite. Alors pourquoi ne pas profiter de ce déplacement pour démontrer, de façon concrète, l’attachement de la France à la liberté d’expression et son rejet de la peine de mort ?

Les discussions entre le président français et son homologue mauritanien, le général Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, seront probablement dominées par la lutte contre le terrorisme au Sahel, une priorité absolue pour Macron. Le président mauritanien a par le passé loué le «pragmatisme» de Macron, mais il est essentiel que ce dernier n’oublie pas les principes et valeurs, notamment ceux des droits humains, dont il proclame qu’ils guident la diplomatie française. Lors de sa première visite officielle en Afrique de l’Ouest en novembre, Macron avait souhaité poser les jalons d’un nouveau dialogue avec ses homologues africains et proposé «d’inventer une amitié pour agir», en rappelant que «le ciment de l’amitié, c’est de commencer par tout se dire».

Sous Abdel Aziz, la Mauritanie s’est érigée en garante de la lutte contre la menace terroriste grandissante dans la région du Sahel, tout en adoptant des lois liberticides qui définissent les infractions terroristes de manière trop vague, permettant aux autorités de museler les opposants et activistes dont le discours déplaît au pouvoir. La loi antiterroriste adoptée en 2010 a valu à Abdallahi Salem Ould Yali, un activiste de la communauté «haratine» – Mauritaniens arabophones, à la peau noire, descendants d’esclaves – d’être poursuivi pour incitation au fanatisme ethnique ou racial, comportement qui constitue une «infraction terroriste». Sa faute ? Avoir diffusé des messages dans un groupe de discussion WhatsApp dénonçant la discrimination dont est victime son groupe ethnique et invitant celui-ci à faire valoir ses droits. Yali est détenu depuis le 24 janvier.

Le même chef d’accusation pèse sur Oumar Ould Beibacar, colonel de la Garde nationale désormais à la retraite, qui a eu le courage de dénoncer les exécutions sommaires de ses co-officiers en 1992 dans une purge d’officiers noirs de l’armée et de demander des comptes au gouvernement mauritanien pour ces crimes que les autorités préfèrent ignorer. A la suite de ses déclarations en 2015, Beibacar a été placé sous contrôle judiciaire et son passeport confisqué. La justice refuse de trancher ou de classer cette affaire depuis près de trois ans.

Sous Abdel Aziz, la Mauritanie s’est érigée en garante de la lutte contre la menace terroriste grandissante dans la région du Sahel, tout en adoptant des lois liberticides qui définissent les infractions terroristes de manière trop vague, permettant aux autorités de museler les opposants et activistes dont le discours déplaît au pouvoir

Dans une récente interview à Jeune Afrique, le président Aziz a affirmé que «toutes les libertés sont garanties en Mauritanie, nous n’avons pas un seul prisonnier politique». Au-delà d’Abdellahi Yali, deux militants anti-esclavagistes purgent actuellement une peine de deux ans à la prison de Bir Moghreïn, aux confins du désert, au terme d’un procès inéquitable.

Le cas le plus révélateur reste celui de Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mkhaitir, un blogueur mauritanien arrêté en janvier 2014 puis condamné à mort pour apostasie après avoir publié un article en ligne remettant en cause l’utilisation par certains de ses compatriotes de la religion pour légitimer la discrimination fondée sur les castes. L’ironie est saisissante : voici un Etat qui prétend s’ériger en rempart contre l’extrémisme religieux et ses diktats, mais dont les tribunaux imposent la peine capitale pour un délit d’expression jugé offensant envers la religion d’Etat.

En novembre dernier, la peine de Mkhaitir a été commuée par la cour d’appel de Nouadhibou en une peine de prison de deux ans, le rendant éligible à une libération immédiate. Depuis lors, il demeure pourtant détenu dans un lieu inconnu, en dehors de tout cadre légal. Seule une pression extérieure semble aujourd’hui susceptible de changer le cours des choses pour ce jeune homme : le président français devrait ainsi appeler le président mauritanien à libérer Mkhaitir dans les plus brefs délais, dans le respect du droit, mauritanien comme international.

Macron devrait aussi interroger son homologue sur le durcissement des lois ayant trait à la liberté d’expression et d’association en Mauritanie. En avril dernier, l’Assemblée nationale a adopté une loi prévoyant que tout musulman coupable d’apostasie ou de blasphème sera obligatoirement condamné à mort, sans possibilité de formuler une demande de clémence fondée sur le repentir.

Ce texte viole de multiples garanties du droit international protégeant la liberté d’expression, le droit à un procès équitable et le droit à la vie. Des experts des Nations unies et de la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples ont exhorté les députés à reconsidérer cette loi, que le président Abdel Aziz a justifié comme une revendication émanant de «la rue».

Les difficultés que pose la coopération avec les gouvernements répressifs dans la lutte contre le terrorisme ne sont pas nouvelles. Mais comment cette coopération pourrait-elle être fructueuse, à long terme, si l’Etat partenaire instrumentalise ses outils de lutte contre le terrorisme pour réprimer des manifestations pacifiques et sanctionner l’apostasie et le blasphème par la peine de mort ? Macron ne devrait pas manquer l’occasion de sa rencontre avec son homologue mauritanien, pour clairement dire que, pour être efficace, la lutte antiterroriste ne saurait passer par la suppression des droits fondamentaux et l’écrasement de toute voix critique.

 

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Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Mauritania

Author(s): United States Department of State

Date of Publication: 19 September 2018

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Overview: Mauritania was an excellent U.S. security and regional counterterrorism partner in 2017. Since 2011, when U.S. engagement with Mauritanian security forces greatly increased and Mauritanian forces defeated al-Qa’ida elements in three separate battles, Mauritania has not suffered a terrorist attack, despite continuing terrorist violence in neighboring Mali.

The Government of Mauritania continued to oppose terrorism effectively, building on an approach that hinges on community outreach, improving the capacity of security forces, and securing the country’s borders. The government has continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and seized opportunities to participate in U.S.-sponsored training on counterterrorism tactics and techniques.

Mauritania Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Services worked with the United States to track, monitor, and counter terrorist groups, which include al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), ISIS, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) – the group that formed after the Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together in 2017.

Through the support of the United States and other partners such as France, Mauritania deployed 20,000 soldiers, divided between seven military regions around the country. Despite these efforts, regions in the interior of Mauritania remained imperfectly monitored, owing to their geographic isolation from population centers and inhospitable desert conditions.

AQIM elements and like-minded terrorist groups were present in the region, particularly along the southeastern border with Mali, which remained the leading terrorist threat to Mauritania in 2017. On November 6, Mauritanian press reported that AQIM released a new video in which it warned Mauritania of consequences for its cooperation with the so-called “crusaders’ forces.”

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Border security remained inadequate due to a standing policy that accords responsibility for different sections of the country’s land borders to different formations of the security forces. Owing to their geographic isolation from population centers, hard-to-access areas of the Sahara Desert further complicated efforts to monitor and secure borders.

On November 12, Mauritania declared its border with Algeria a military “Red Zone,” forbidden to civilians. This decision was motivated by the increased and diverse trafficking of prohibited goods through this region.

In collaboration with Mauritanian authorities, the Senegalese security forces arrested two suspected Algerian terrorists from ISIS on October 6 at the Mauritanian border crossing of Rosso. The two suspects were wanted by the Government of Algeria.

The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, in cooperation with host nation partner forces, provided training for 160 police officers and gendarmerie in topics including facilities protection, border security, interviewing terrorist suspects, crisis incident management, weapons of mass destruction, and border security and interdiction.

In collaboration with Mauritanian authorities, the Senegalese security forces arrested two suspected Algerian terrorists from ISIS on October 6 at the Mauritanian border crossing of Rosso. The two suspects were wanted by the Government of Algeria.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Mauritania is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. In 2017, Mauritania applied for membership within the Egmont Group. There were no other significant changes since 2016. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2018 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): The Mauritanian government continued to support CVE programs and offer alternatives to at-risk individuals. During 2017, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education (MIATE) hosted a two-day regional workshop in Nouakchott to share the Mauritanian CVE experiences with representatives from the Maghreb countries and the G-5 Sahel countries. The workshop was organized in cooperation with the American Friendship Project.

The MIATE collaborated with independent Islamic religious groups to counter radicalization to violence in a series of workshops in all 15 provinces. The MIATE organized an international conference on “Violence and Extremism from Sharia’s Perspective,” held on March 19, 2017.

In coordination with two University of Nouakchott professors, a think tank, and some society leaders, the U.S. Embassy organized a two-day awareness training workshop for university students on violent extremism, how to recognize possible recruitment activities, and strategies to counter them. The southern Mauritanian city of Kiffa is a member of the Strong Cities Network. Mauritanian political and religious personalities periodically condemned ISIS’s aims, methods, and activities in public statements.

International and Regional Cooperation: Nouakchott serves as host to the headquarters of the G-5 Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Mauritania will be responsible for the western sector of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force located along the border between Mauritania and Mali.

Under the auspices of the G-5 Sahel, Mauritania, the European Union, and the German Agency of International Cooperation, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime organized a meeting of experts on mechanisms and standards for information exchange within the Security Cooperation Platform of the G-5 Sahel in Nouakchott on October 24-25, 2017.

 

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As Threats Mount, Can Mauritania’s Fragile Stability Hold?

Author(s): Anouar Boukhars

Date of Publication: June 16, 2016

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Against a broader backdrop of regional turmoil, Mauritania has remained surprisingly, if delicately stable. This feat is especially noteworthy given that just a few years ago the country was considered at significant risk of destabilization. Its politics and society have been perennially buffeted by the storms of racial tensions, ethnic cleavages and political volatility.

Since its independence from France in 1960, Mauritania has wavered precariously between this state of fragile stability and state collapse. Its record of successive coups and attempted coups between 1978 and 2008; major ethnic clashes in 1989 and 1990; and terrorist attacks between 2005 and 2011 have put the country at a constant boiling point. Yet Mauritania never collapsed into civil war or violent disintegration.

Tucked between Arab North Africa and black West Africa, Mauritania faces several multifaceted problems and structural challenges. Five domains of insecurity have emerged as especially critical: a challenging political climate marked by unresolved tensions between the president and the opposition; a deteriorating economic outlook filled with considerable uncertainty; the hardening of socio-political tensions rooted in historical ethno-racial divisions; the growing radicalization of social movements; and the threat of internal militancy. These five factors reinforce each other, creating a vicious circle that must be broken in order for the country to avoid destabilization.

Simmering Political Tensions

The president has so far tried to divide the opposition by enticing the most conciliatory members of the 16-party opposition coalition, grouped under the banner of the Forum for Democracy and Unity (FNDU), into a vague and undefined national dialogue. So far, these attempts have been rebuffed despite emerging signs of fracture within the FNDU. Tawassoul, an Islamist party, has cleverly kept one foot in the FNDU and another in the government’s door by not boycotting the 2013 legislative elections, in contrast to virtually all other opposition parties, which refused to recognize the vote.

As a result, Tawassoul is the only member of the opposition bloc represented in parliament. Other fault lines in the FDNU run between the hard-liners, such as the Rally of Democratic Forces party led by Ahmed Ould Daddah, who insists on written guarantees by the president that he will not run in 2019; and conciliatory politicians such as the FNDU’s president, Ahmed Salem Ould Bouhoubeyni, who believes that the best option remains a resumption of political dialogue through which the regime and the opposition can pursue a win-win solution.

Risks of Economic Derailment

The second biggest risk facing Mauritania is its deteriorating economic outlook. The floundering of state revenues and finances—caused mainly by a precipitous decline in the price of the country’s extractive resources, particularly minerals—risks aggravating poverty and economic inequality. The fact that the economic crisis is occurring amid rumors and allegations of government corruption adds to popular frustrations and undermines the president’s carefully crafted platform to fight graft and improve transparency.

Abdel Aziz has banked on economic growth, development and a reduction in corruption as the best means of alleviating socio-economic inequalities and racial and ethnic grievances. The economic downturn comes at a bad time on both counts.

The slump in commodity prices now places Mauritania’s economy, and with it the president’s plans, at risk. If the prices of minerals, especially iron ore, remain low for long, Abdel Aziz might find it difficult to contain popular contestations, especially those powered by racial and ethnic discontent. The president certainly hopes that the fiscal buffers the country built up during the years of the commodities boom and the maintenance of prudent macroeconomic stability will help him weather the current financial turbulence.

With 4 percent economic growth, a 3 percent budget deficit and 1 percent inflation, Mauritania can hold on for a year or two before the economic crisis starts to bite. Abdel Aziz would therefore be ill-advised to keep delaying the needed reforms to defuse political tensions and the socio-economic drivers of social conflict. Banking on the prospect that depressed commodity prices will recover or that the political opposition will implode is a dangerous gamble.

Ethno-Racial Powder Keg

The third source of insecurity that is constantly hovering over and menacing Mauritania’s stability is the real risk of ethnic and racial confrontations. At its core, ethnic and racial tensions tend to center on the grievances of black communities against a legal, political and cultural system characterized by the dominance of light-skinned moors. Grievances are especially associated with a set of factors rooted in the predatory politics of racial discrimination, ethnic socio-economic exclusion and inequality.

Since independence, the Haratine, which share the same language and culture as their former masters, the Bidhan, have gotten the short end of the stick, suffering from the most painful and outrageous forms of socioeconomic, legal and institutional exploitation. Despite representing only 40 percent of the population, the Haratine constitute an estimated 80 percent of Mauritanians living in absolute poverty, 85 percent of the country’s illiterate, 90 percent of small farmers without the right to own land, and conversely just 2 percent of officials in positions of high authority.

The third source of insecurity that is constantly hovering over and menacing Mauritania’s stability is the real risk of ethnic and racial confrontations

The Afro-Mauritanians historically fared slightly better, as they have not faced the same level of severe socio-economic conditions as the Haratine. But as is the case for all vulnerable non-Arabic-speaking populations in Mauritania, Afro-Mauritanians’ situation has remained what has been described as “structurally precarious,” and the group has always been vulnerable to political and economic discrimination.

It is important to note, however, that conflicts over access to and management of land and other natural resources do not always have an ethnic or racial dimension. Intra-group tensions are prevalent within the same ethnic groups and tribes. Some of the Afro-Mauritanians repatriated from Senegal in the late 2000s, for instance, are actively challenging the traditional hierarchies that historically favored black landowners with significant land holdings. By denouncing the feudal system, they hope to claim land they historically cultivated for the black noble families that owned it.

Radicalization of Social Movements

This brings us to the fourth factor of instability, which deals with the radicalization of social movements. Protests and strikes are occurring with increasing frequency in a tense political and economic climate. Labor unrest in the mining sector degenerated in 2015 into a prolonged strike at the state-owned National Industrial and Mining Company, or Societe Nationale Industrielle et Miniere (SNIM), which accounts for an estimated 15 percent of GDP. The two-month strike over a salary dispute paralyzed the country’s northern economy and threatened its hard currency earnings. Mining workers and the legions of unemployed in the north also complain bitterly that the government doesn’t reinvest SNIM’s profits in the regions where the industry is based.

The spike in protests is not limited to the mining sector, and encompasses an ever-growing number of industries. Since the onset of the 2011 Arab revolts, societal contention has become much broader, even if the politics of protest remains fractured along sectoral lines and interests. The driving force behind the multiplication of protests is the desire for an equitable sharing of resources and an end to socio-economic exclusion and political discrimination. This societal contention has never escalated into serious calls for Abdel Aziz’s removal as president, even if the political opposition tried unsuccessfully to mobilize a movement for political change.

The dynamics of contention, however, have hardened along ethnic and racial lines. The Haratine who at 40 percent of the population are Mauritania’s largest ethno-racial group and at 70 percent of the army make up the majority of its soldiers have become increasingly assertive in their demands for social equality and inclusion into positions of power. In April 2013, civil society organizations and Haratine community leaders issued a manifesto that demanded the immediate fulfillment of their political, economic and social rights.

This manifesto upped the ante through higher demands that are no longer limited to redressing the classic grievances against exclusion of Haratine from top posts in the military and other positions of political and economic power. The central issue driving the protests centers on a distribution of resources, wealth and power according to the relative population size of each ethnic and racial group. To achieve these goals, the protesters are demanding positive discrimination.

The dynamics of Haratine and Afro-Mauritanian activism foreshadow a period of deep uncertainty. The potential outcomes or effects of such contestation will largely depend on the state’s attention and responses to intensifying grievances. The same applies to non-ethnic protests driven by socio-economic grievances. Governance flaws and the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a very small political and economic elite are major sources of instability in Mauritania.

The overall pattern of political and economic domination has remained unchanged for decades despite the country’s many regime changes. At the center of influence are often the same protagonists who share family ties and clientelist linkages. When there is a reconfiguration in the distribution of power, as is usually the case following a coup, it involves individuals, leaving the same dominant bloc in place.

Internal Militancy

The fifth domain of insecurity is the threat of internal radicalization. At present, the risk of homegrown militancy is still at an embryonic stage. As a result of Mauritania’s two-track approach to extremism—the rehabilitation of dozens of former radicals and the state’s tough counterterrorism crackdown—the most virulent Salafi ideologues in Mauritania have either recanted their previous promotion of jihad or are languishing in jail.

The significant falloff in terrorist attacks in the country since 2011, when Mauritania suffered its last one, is also in large part due to the government’s determined efforts to upgrade the army, strengthen border security, and enhance regional security cooperation. France and the United States have also provided critical support to Nouakchott’s counterterrorism efforts through the supply of vital training, equipment and intelligence to the country’s military and security forces.

These achievements do not mean that Mauritania is no longer vulnerable to terrorist destabilization, however. Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) and associated violent extremist groups may currently be preoccupied with broadening their influence in countries south of the Sahara. But if Mauritania’s economic and political crisis deepens, the chances that its fragile stability might be shattered would increase dramatically. Yet another descent into precariousness could in turn boost recruitment into militant groups and invite further terrorist attacks.

The significant falloff in terrorist attacks in the country since 2011, when Mauritania suffered its last one, is also in large part due to the government’s determined efforts to upgrade the army, strengthen border security, and enhance regional security cooperation

For now, it is difficult to assess the trajectory of violent militancy in Mauritania. Young Mauritanians associated with militant activities or hard-line Salafi ideologues can be found across the country, as was evidenced in October 2014 with the arrest of four youths in the mining city of Zouerate on the northern border. The men belonged to a cell accused of having ties to the so-called Islamic State; one was a “repentant” jihadi freed in 2011 after allegedly recanting his extremist views.

In August 2015, the government apprehended another Salafi-jihadi cell that included a previously jailed major ideologue of violence, Mohammad Lemine Ould Mohamed Salem al-Majlissi. In September 2015, another purportedly repentant ideologue, Dahoud Ould Sebti, was once again arrested for incitement of hatred.

External Domains of Insecurity

Whatever the truth is, this lull in terrorist attacks since 2011 is not guaranteed to last long. As long as the Sahel and Sahara remain a hotbed for extremist groups and jihadi recruitment, the specter of terrorism will loom large over Mauritania. Of particular concern are Mauritanian jihadis battle-hardened from operating in the Sahel and Sahara with groups such as al-Mourabitoun and AQIM. Their potential return to their home country must be cause of concern to Mauritanian authorities.

For now, it is difficult to assess the trajectory of violent militancy in Mauritania. Young Mauritanians associated with militant activities or hard-line Salafi ideologues can be found across the country, as was evidenced in October 2014 with the arrest of four youths in the mining city of Zouerate on the northern border.

The Precarious Path Ahead

Abdel Aziz’s ability to maintain Mauritania’s fragile stability is noteworthy in a country bedeviled by political fault lines, military coups, ethno-racial tensions and budding militancy. Under his leadership, the Mauritanian government has neutralized terrorist threats, restored macroeconomic stability, contained inflation and improved tax collection. The president also seems to have consolidated his power base in the military. His investments in modernizing the army, coupled with important increases in salaries and opportunities for promotion and training, have permitted Abdel Aziz to gain the army’s goodwill, at least until the next political crisis.

But despite the progress toward stability, Mauritania is at risk of social and political unrest. Its commodity-heavy economy remains highly exposed to external shocks and catastrophic bouts of drought and water shortages. At the regional level, the country is vulnerable to terrorist spillover and the economic implications of Ebola-style epidemics among its neighboring trading partners in West Africa. All this significant uncertainty threatens to undercut Abdel Aziz’s efforts to contain simmering political tensions and hardening ethno-racial positions and demands.

 

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Mauritania ー Will Islamist Crackdown Make It a Terrorist Target?

Author(s) : Andrew McGregor

Date of publication: December 19, 2018

Link to original document

When Mauritania’s President Mohamed Ould Abd al-Aziz identified political Islamists as extremists and national enemies last August, his bluntness surprised some observers: “Proponents of political Islam are all extremists… Islamists, who practice politics and wear ties, can take up arms if they cannot achieve their goals via politics” (Saudi Gazette, August 31).

Faced with what authorities believe is religious and political interference in Mauritania by Iran and Qatar and the threat posed by jihadists lurking along the border with Mali, the president has undertaken several steps to scale back Islamist activities in Mauritania. These include the closing of Islamic universities and moving towards a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood.

Mauritanian troops are also now operating with the French-backed Sahel Group of Five (G5S–a regional security and development alliance that includes Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) to tackle Islamist terrorism throughout the Sahara-Sahel region. Mauritania’s poverty and an unemployment rate of 40 percent, however, make it an inviting target for political interference and religious agitation.

The Presidential Succession

Elections last September gave the ruling Union for the Republic (Union pour la République —UPR) party a majority in Mauritania’s National Assembly. The president has promised to step down at the end of his second term in 2019, though some suspect he may still be considering a third term. Abd al-Aziz is expected to choose his own successor and may select a military official as Mauritania’s next president with the support of the reliably loyal UPR. Abd al-Aziz is a former UPR leader but was required to officially step away from the party when he became president. The Mauritanian opposition has warned that the nation’s stability, “will suffer if the next president again comes directly from the army ranks” (Arab Weekly, November 4).

Mauritania’s Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Education

In late September, authorities shut down two Islamic higher education institutions in Nouakchott, the Mauritanian capital. These institutions—the University of Abdullah ibn Yasin and the Center for Training Islamic Scholars—were both believed to be closely tied to the Tewassoul Party. Mauritanian Muslim Brotherhood leader and prominent preacher Mohamed al-Hassan Ould Dadou was a leading faculty member at both institutions. The action resulted in student demonstrations and the arrest of two academics (University World News, October 2).

Mauritanian troops are also now operating with the French-backed Sahel Group of Five (G5S–a regional security and development alliance that includes Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) to tackle Islamist terrorism throughout the Sahara-Sahel region

Mauritania and the Struggle for the Middle East

Mauritanians are overwhelmingly followers of the Sunni Maliki madhab (school of Islamic jurisprudence), but there are fears amongst top clerics and other officials in Mauritania of an Iranian campaign to convert Mauritanians to Shi’ism.

Relations between Iran and Mauritania began to warm in 2008, after the military coup led by Abd al-Aziz and the consequent severing of relations with Israel. Since then, however, Mauritania has been pulled into the Arab-Iranian dispute in the Middle East and relations with Iran have suffered as a result.

In early June, Mauritania was one of several Arab nations to join the anti-Qatar, “Quartet,” of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar over its alleged support for terrorism and religious extremism. A Mauritanian government spokesman, Mohamed Ishaq al-Kenti, claimed that Qatar was funding both Tewassoul and the Mauritanian Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt Today, September 8). UPR chief Sidi Mohamed Maham stated in October that, “all Qatari attempts at intervention in [Mauritania] have failed… their bad intentions are clear towards the state of Mauritania” (al-Arabiya, October 5).

The Mauritanian opposition has warned that the nation’s stability, “will suffer if the next president again comes directly from the army ranks”

The Military Dimension

Mauritania’s military struggle with modern jihadism began in June 2005, when militants belonging to Algeria’s Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat—GSPC) crossed the border and attacked the Lemgheity military camp in Mauritania’s far north, killing 17 soldiers before withdrawing with prisoners, weapons and vehicles.

Only weeks after the 2008 military coup, gunmen from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) captured a Mauritanian patrol at Tourine. All 12 members of the patrol were decapitated and mutilated (RFI, September 16, 2008). The incident spurred General Ould Abd al-Aziz (then President of the High Council of State) and his old comrade, General Ould al-Ghazouani, to embark on an energetic program of reforms in the military designed to increase its efficiency, skills and operational capability.

The most important step in the military reforms was to create small but highly autonomous and mobile Special Intervention Groups (Groupements spéciaux d’Intervention—GSI) led by energetic junior officers. The GSIs, each consisting of about 200 men, are capable of finding and destroying jihadist groups from advanced positions. Arms that were once directed to presidential security units were diverted to increase the firepower of the GSIs (Jeune Afrique, November 8, 2017; Le Point Afrique, July 18). American weapons and coordination with the Mauritanian Air Force’s Brazilian-made A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft gave Mauritanian counter-insurgency operations a new punch.

According to General Ould al-Ghazouni, military action is not enough: “We need development, to fight against the extreme poverty of a population that has no water, no food… There cannot be a rich army and a poor population” (Jeune Afrique, November 8, 2017). The general has identified several areas where military efficiency could be improved, including the provision of updated maps, a computerized operations room and technological training for recruits (Jeune Afrique, November 8, 2017).

The most important step in the military reforms was to create small but highly autonomous and mobile Special Intervention Groups (Groupements spéciaux d’Intervention—GSI) led by energetic junior officers

The G5 Sahel

Though Mauritania’s military is still short of funding, training, and advanced arms, it is fully committed to participation in the French-backed G5S anti-terrorist alliance. The total force consists of seven battalions two each from Niger and Mali, and one each from Mauritania, Chad and Burkina Faso. France provides intelligence and logistical assistance through its Operation Barkhane, a French counter-terrorist operation in the Sahara-Sahel region. Unlike its G5S partners, Mauritania does not allow French troops on its soil.

The G5S has three zones of operation. The first is the Mali-Mauritania border region, the second is the triangular border region shared by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, while the third zone is along the Niger-Chad border. Mauritania and Mali each contribute a battalion to the G5S’s Western Zone of operations. Mauritania has a history of cross-border military operations in northern Mali, endured with varying degrees of acquiescence from the weak Malian government.

Conclusion

Typical of a career military man, President Ould Abd al-Aziz is taking a direct approach to the problem of political Islam, attempting to eliminate armed Islamists beyond Mauritania’s borders while forcing domestic Islamists to the political and religious sidelines of Mauritanian society. Meanwhile, the nation’s economic weakness, high unemployment, and deep Islamic traditions make it attractive to extremists.

The combination of a potential state-wide ban of the Muslim Brotherhood, an aggressive military stand against jihadism and uncertainty over the presidential succession could make Mauritania a target for exploitation from regional jihadist groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa’l-Muslimin, which is highly active just across the border with Mali.

Though Mauritania’s military is still short of funding, training, and advanced arms, it is fully committed to participation in the French-backed G5S anti-terrorist alliance. The total force consists of seven battalions two each from Niger and Mali, and one each from Mauritania, Chad and Burkina Faso

However, there are reasons why Mauritania might survive this period of uncertainty. There appears to be little internal support for armed Islamism at this time, and regional jihadists do not appear to consider Mauritania a priority since their 2011 defeat in the Wagadou Forest.  Much will depend on how far the president or his successor will go in attempting to root out Islamist influence in politics and education. The emergence of a significant degree of religiously-based internal dissent could act like a beacon for the region’s armed jihadists.