WATHI propose une sélection de documents sur le contexte économique, social et politique au Nigéria. Chaque document est présenté sous forme d’extraits qui peuvent faire l’objet de légères modifications. Les notes de bas ou de fin de page ne sont pas reprises dans les versions de WATHI. Nous vous invitons à consulter les documents originaux pour toute citation et tout travail de recherche.
Nigeria : la situation sécuritaire, le grand dilemme de Buhari pour se faire réélire
Auteur (s) : Jeune Afrique avec Agence France-Presse (AFP)
Date de Publication: 2018
La multiplication des conflits et l’insécurité au Nigeria feront partie des grands enjeux de l’élection présidentielle prévue en février 2019, à laquelle Muhammadu Buhari a déjà annoncé son intention de se représenter.
Recrudescence de la grande criminalité
Outre Boko Haram, les affrontements entre agriculteurs sédentaires et éleveurs nomades qui secouent depuis des mois les Etats du centre pourraient influer de façon significative sur le scrutin. Ces violences « ont fait plus de victimes civiles que l’insurrection de Boko Haram et pourraient continuer d’en faire à l’avenir », affirme à l’AFP Ryan Cummings, spécialiste de l’Afrique au cabinet de conseil Signal Risk, basé en Afrique du Sud.
Ailleurs, la grande criminalité et les enlèvements contre rançon ont connu une recrudescence, notamment dans le nord, tandis que les tensions persistent dans le sud-est, où des mouvements séparatistes pro-Biafra contestent l’autorité d’Abuja.
« Le président Buhari n’a pas tenu sa promesse »
Pour beaucoup, Muhammadu Buhari, qui a dirigé un gouvernement militaire dans les années 1980, représentait alors le seul espoir de mettre fin au conflit, qui a fait au moins 20.000 morts depuis 2009 dans la région du lac Tchad. Il a en partie atteint son objectif, en chassant les islamistes des localités qu’ils contrôlaient, mais les attaques et attentats-suicides contre des civils et des militaires continuent à semer la terreur au quotidien.
Fin février, l’enlèvement de plus d’une centaine de jeunes filles dans un internat à Dapchi, dans l’État de Yobe (nord-est), a encore une fois démontré que leur capacité de nuire restait immense. Malgré les progrès réalisés, « il est juste de dire que le président Buhari n’a pas tenu sa promesse de vaincre Boko Haram durant son premier mandat », souligne Ryan Cummings.
États-clés
Mais le chef de l’État est aujourd’hui très critiqué pour sa gestion de la crise entre éleveurs nomades et agriculteurs sédentaires dans les États de Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau et Kogi, où plusieurs centaines de personnes ont été tuées depuis le début de l’année.
Or ce sont des États-clés, points de rencontre entre le nord musulman et le sud majoritairement chrétien, dont l’électorat oscille selon les élections entre les deux principaux partis, le Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) et le All Progressive Congress (APC, au pouvoir).
Malgré les progrès réalisés, il est juste de dire que le président Buhari n’a pas tenu sa promesse de vaincre Boko Haram durant son premier mandat
À Benue, un État APC, un représentant des chefs tribaux, Edward Ujege, a affirmé à l’AFP que Muhammadu Buhari « ne méritait pas un seul vote (…) parce qu’il n’a pas réussi à nous apporter la sécurité ». Le conflit séculaire pour l’accès à la terre et à l’eau a pris ces derniers mois une dimension identitaire, l’ethnie locale des Tiv accusant les éleveurs peuls de saccager leurs fermes et obligeant la plupart d’entre eux à quitter la région.
« Aucune volonté politique »
Muhammadu Buhari, dont la candidature doit encore être validée par son parti, « a probablement perdu le vote à Benue », selon Amaechi Nwokolo, analyste pour le Roman Institute for International Studies à Abuja. « Il ne gagnera peut-être pas dans de nombreux États qui ont été ravagés (par les violences) et beaucoup de gens vont utiliser cela contre lui », estime-t-il.
Pour Ndi Kato, qui milite pour les droits des populations autochtones, il n’y a « aucune volonté politique » de mettre fin à la violence dans le centre du pays, qui a fait des dizaines de milliers de déplacés. « La Middle Belt (ceinture centrale) ne votera pas pour ce gouvernement », assure-t-elle. Mais nous ne savons pas pour qui elle votera – et c’est un autre problème ».
Nigeria: Security Situation
Author (s) : European Asylum Support Office (EASO)
Date of publication: 2018
Link to the original publication
Background Information
“From the outside, conflict dynamics can be bewildering in their complexity, particularly in a country as vast as Nigeria with telescoping fault-lines and polarities. After gaining independence from the United Kingdom in October 1960, the country fell into a civil war that killed over a million people before it finally ended in 1970. Military rule gave way to the Fourth Republic with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999.
Since then conflict in Nigeria has included an insurgency in the Niger Delta which deescalated in 2009 as a result of an amnesty program for militants, periodic outbreaks of killing in the Middle Belt, and rising levels of violence in the Northeast. In April of 2011, hundreds were killed in post-election violence across the North. Violence ranges from the criminal, to intra-communal, inter-communal, ethnic, sectarian, political, and regional.” (FfP, 21 April 2014).
“Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the state’s authority and legitimacy. Despite extensive oil and natural gas resources, Nigeria’s human development indicators are among the world’s lowest, and a majority of the population faces extreme poverty.” (CRS, 18 July 2012, Summary).
“Ethnic and religious strife have been common in Nigeria. Divisions among ethnic groups, between north and south, and between Christians and Muslims often stem from issues relating to access to land, jobs, and socioeconomic development, and are sometimes fueled by politicians. […] An increasingly active violent Islamist group, Boko Haram, has contributed to deteriorating security conditions in the north and seeks to capitalize on local frustrations and discredit the government. […] In the southern Niger Delta region, local grievances related to oil production in the area have fueled simmering conflict and criminality for over a decade. The government’s efforts to negotiate with local militants, including through an amnesty program, have quieted the restive region, but the peace is fragile and violent criminality continues.” (CRS, 18 July 2012, p. 1)
Northern Nigeria and Boko Haram
(States: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, Zamfara)
Background Information
“Boko Haram grew out of a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Al- Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno state, in the 1990s. Its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, began as a preacher and leader in the youth wing, Shababul Islam (Islamic Youth Vanguard), of Ahl-Sunnah, a Salafi group. […] Most accounts date the beginning of Boko Haram – its formal Arabic name is Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) – to 2002, when it began to attract official attention.” (ICG, 3 April 2014, p. 7)
“[…] the group is more popularly known as Boko Haram (often translated as ‘Western education is forbidden’), a nickname given by local Hausa-speaking communities to describe the group’s view that Western education and culture have been corrupting influences that are haram (‘forbidden’) under its conservative interpretation of Islam.“ (CRS, 29 July 2014, p. 1)
“In 2014 Boko Haram killed more than 4,000 people, although the true figure is almost certainly higher. In the first three months of 2015, Boko Haram fighters killed at least 1,500 civilians. The group bombed civilian targets across Nigeria, raided towns and villages in the north-east and from July 2014 began to capture major towns. By February 2015, it controlled the majority of Borno state, as well as northern Adamawa state and eastern Yobe state. In August 2014, Abubakar Shekau, the group’s leader, proclaimed this territory to be a caliphate. Tens of thousands of civilians were subjected to Boko Haram’s brutal rule.” (AI, 13 April 2015, p. 3)
“Later, Mr Shekau formally pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS), turning his back on al-Qaeda. IS accepted the pledge, naming the territory under Boko Haram’s control as the Islamic State of West Africa Province and as being part of the global caliphate it was trying to establish.” (BBC, 4 May 2015)
“In March 2015, BH [Boko Haram] pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In August 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led the group to split. Shekau maintains a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction is known as Boko Haram. The Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria routinely call both groups Boko Haram, with some differentiation on the ‘Shekau faction’ versus the ‘al-Barnawi faction.’” (USDOS, 19 September 2018)
“Boko Haram overtakes ISIL to become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 317 per cent in 2014 to 6,644.“ (IEP, November 2015, p. 4) “Counterinsurgency efforts are reported to have become more effective following the inauguration in May 2015 of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari…However, according to analysts, a comprehensive military victory is unlikely, and the insurgents continue to pose a considerable security threat.“ (UNHCR, October 2016, p. 1f)
Current Situation
According to unofficial military information heavily armed fighters of the Islamist terror organization Boko Haram attacked the military base in Garunda village (Borno state, Guzamala Local Government Area) that is still under construction. The statement says that 17 soldiers were killed and 14 injured, an agent of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) was killed as well. The terrorists took away vehicles and weapons. This is the third Boko Haram attack on a military base since 14 July 2018.“ (BAMF, 13 August 2018, p. 5).
“Fighters of the Boko Haram splinter group Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) attacked the city of Gudumbali in Borno state (administrative seat of the Guzamala Local Government Area) on 07 September 2018. They occupied and looted the local military base and abandoned Gudumbali again on 08 September 2018. Local militias reported that eight civilians lost their lives in the attack which the army denied. In June 2018 the government had declared the Guzamala region as safe and called upon the about 2,000 refugees from the area to return home from the refugee camps. Returnees reported being told that their state support would be cut, if they refused to return…” (BAMF, 10 September 2018, p. 6)
“An aid worker with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been killed in Nigeria by Islamist militants who kidnapped her last March. Hauwa Liman, a midwife, was killed days after kidnappers set a deadline. The ICRC said it was devastated by the news. The Nigerian government called the murder ‘inhuman and ungodly’. Ms Liman was taken with two others in the northern Nigerian town of Rann. Fellow midwife Saifura Ahmed Khorsa was killed last month.
A 15-year-old schoolgirl, Leah Sharibu, is being held by the same militant group, Islamic State West Africa Province (Iswap), which is affiliated to the Islamic State group and is a faction of the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram.” (BBC, 16 October 2018) “Insecurity is escalating in northwest Nigeria’s Zamfara state, with daily killings and kidnappings by armed bandits leaving villagers in constant fear of attack, Amnesty International said today. Thousands of people have been displaced by a conflict, which began in 2012 as a result of clashes between farmers and herders. […]
“Two suicide bombers have attacked a town in north-eastern Nigeria only hours after the country’s army chief urged displaced residents to return home because it was safe. The blasts hit the town of Damboa in Borno state on Saturday evening and residents say at least 31 people died. The explosions were followed up by rockets fired from outside the town. Boko Haram militants are suspected. Army chief Lt Gen Tukur Buratai had said they were no longer a threat.” (BBC, 17 June 2018)
“Cattle rustling added to insecurity in the north-western states of Nigeria, […] During the reporting period, there was an overall decrease in attacks attributed to Boko Haram in the Niger, while Nigeria witnessed an increase in the scope and number of attacks. […] The Nigerian armed forces, supported by the Multinational Joint Task Force, reportedly pushed Boko Haram out of several areas in north-eastern Nigeria. However, the group continued to launch deadly attacks and remained a significant threat. Since the beginning of 2018, Boko Haram is believed to have been responsible for more than 90 attacks, resulting in at least 260 casualties in Nigeria alone.” (UN Security Council, 29 June 2018, pp. 4-5)
Southern Nigeria, Biafra and the Niger Delta
(States: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Bayelsa, Cross River State, Delta, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Ondo, Rivers)
Background Information
“The Niger Delta, in southern Nigeria, is a paradox, rich in resources but poor and racked by insecurity. A combination of local grievances over oil and gas pollution, infrastructure, poverty, unemployment, the region’s share of oil revenues and its marginalisation in national politics led to protests that evolved into a full-blown insurgency in 2006. That rebellion, waged by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), severely disrupted Nigeria’s oil industry, slashing earnings from its exports, the country’s major revenue source.
A June 2009 presidential amnesty for the militants ended the insurgency, restored some stability and created an opportunity for the government to address the multiple grievances and demands at their roots. That opportunity was lost to political inertia and bad governance. Many issues that triggered the conflict remain largely unaddressed. The presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), the first national leader from the region, stipends and training for the former militants and arrangements with insurgency leaders kept a lid on local agitation and conflict.” (ICG, 29 September 2015, p. 1)
“Conflict in the Niger Delta has been marked by the vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive, systemic production theft locally known as ‘oil bunkering,’ often abetted by state officials; protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil operations; kidnapping for ransom; and public insecurity and communal violence. The demands of the region’s various militant groups have varied, but often include calls for greater autonomy for the region and a larger share of oil revenues.
Militant groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have used the kidnapping of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities to bring international attention to the Delta’s plight. […] Successive Nigerian governments have pledged to engage the Delta’s disaffected communities, but few of their efforts met with success until 2009, when President Yar’Adua extended an offer of amnesty to Delta militants.” (CRS, 18 July 2012, p. 13)
“The level of armed violence in the Delta area remained low owing to the reinstated amnesty programme, new deployments of troops in six Delta states and peace initiatives by local, regional, and national leaders.“ (UN Security Council, 26 December 2017, p. 4)
Une arme à double tranchant : comités de vigilance et contre-insurrections africaines
Auteur (s): International Crisis Group (ICG)
Date de Publication: 2017
Lien vers le document original
La Force civile mixte au Nigéria
Le mouvement islamiste radical connu sous le nom de Boko Haram a lancé son insurrection en 2009 dans la ville de Maiduguri, la capitale de l’Etat du Borno dans le nord-est du Nigéria. De là, il s’est étendu aux zones frontalières du Tchad, du Niger et du Cameroun. Les jeunes urbains sans emploi ont constitué l’essentiel du mouvement original, dirigés par un jeune prédicateur charismatique nommé Mohammed Yusuf, qui rejetait l’autorité séculière et cherchait à établir un califat.
Une brutale répression en 2009 par les forces de sécurité nigérianes à Maiduguri – ainsi que la mort de Yusuf pendant sa garde à vue – a poussé le mouvement dans la clandestinité, alimentant une insurrection qui, avec le temps, allait se répandre dans le bassin du lac Tchad. Les tactiques du groupe ont varié avec le temps et selon le lieu ; le groupe a terrorisé la région à la fois par des attentats-suicides dans les grandes villes– parfois bien au-delà du Nord-Est et jusqu’à la capitale fédérale, Abuja – et des attaques de guérilla sur des petites villes et villages, et a mené des enlèvements massifs de jeunes et de femmes, y compris des écolières.
En réponse, les citoyens ont organisé des comités de vigilance pour se protéger à la fois de Boko Haram et des campagnes de contre-insurrection souvent brutales du gouvernement. Alors que ces groupes ont aidé la police et l’armée à lancer des opérations mieux ciblées et plus efficaces, ils ont parfois abusé de leur autorité.
Des comités de vigilance à une force d’intervention civile
Après 2009, Boko Haram a attaqué les forces de sécurité ainsi qu’un large éventail de cibles civiles, y compris des religieux, des politiciens locaux, des chefs de quartier et des étudiants fréquentant des écoles publiques laïques. Début 2013, selon des informations locales, plusieurs résidents ont décidé que les citoyens de Maiduguri devaient s’organiser pour se défendre. Ils ont commencé par chercher, attaquer et tuer des membres de Boko Haram. En juin de cette année-là, environ 500 membres de comités de vigilance tenaient des postes de contrôle, armés seulement de bâtons et de machettes, pour repérer et éliminer les membres de Boko Haram qui allaient et venaient autour de Maiduguri ou tentaient de s’enfuir.
Ils ont choisi pour nom Force civile mixte (Civilian Joint Task Force, CJTF), pour suggérer qu’ils étaient le pendant de la Force gouvernementale mixte (Joint Task Force, JTF) de l’armée, de l’armée de l’air, de la police et d’autres unités de sécurité chargées de combattre Boko Haram dans l’état du Borno. Les membres de comités de vigilance se protégeaient contre une double menace : à la fois de Boko Haram et des forces de sécurité du gouvernement, qui infligeaient des punitions collectives à des communautés suspectées d’héberger des militants, mettant parfois le feu à des maisons et des magasins ou arrêtant – et, dans certains cas, exécutant – des passants de façon arbitraire.
Les citoyens de Maiduguri espéraient peut-être aussi atténuer l’état d’urgence imposé en mai 2013, qui comprenait la suspension des services téléphoniques, une mesure qui a largement paralysé le commerce et la communication dans toute la région. Peu de temps après son émergence, les services de sécurité et les autorités civiles sont devenus étroitement impliqués dans l’organisation, la gestion et les opérations de la Force civile mixte. La Force gouvernementale mixte menée par l’armée a rapidement reconnu le potentiel des comités de vigilance.
Avec l’aide des autorités locales et traditionnelles, elle les a organisés selon sa propre structure de commandement, établissant une unité de la CJTF pour chacun des dix secteurs de sécurité de Maiduguri. Les officiers de la JTF ont aidé à sélectionner les dirigeants de ces comités de vigilance et les responsables de l’état du Borno ont été impliqués dans des rôles de supervision. A partir de septembre 2013, le gouvernement de l’Etat a formellement incorporé la CJTF dans le cadre du programme d’autonomisation des jeunes de Borno (BOYES) et a sélectionné environ 1 850 jeunes hommes – une petite partie de l’effectif total de la CJTF – pour une formation élémentaire au combat.
L’Etat leur a donné des uniformes, des voitures, des documents d’identité et une allocation ; l’armée a ensuite fourni une formation militaire standard à quelque 200 membres supplémentaires pour créer une « Force civile mixte spéciale » pour les opérations de première ligne. Ceux qui ont été sélectionnés pour la formation militaire ont fait l’objet d’un processus de vérification, incluant une analyse de leur parcours antérieur et des examens médicaux. Habituellement, seuls les commandants de secteur portaient des armes modernes, bien que l’armée ait fourni aux membres des fusils d’assaut pour les opérations spécifiques.
A la mi-2013, des membres de la CJTF de Maiduguri ont commencé à accompagner l’armée en dehors de la ville, travaillant à ses côtés pour former des unités sur des territoires qui avaient subi une attaque de Boko Haram ou qui avaient été repris au groupe. La plupart des unités rurales ne disposaient que d’armes traditionnelles telles que des lances, des arcs et des flèches ou des fusils de chasse fabriqués localement. La force s’est également étendue à d’autres Etats du nord-est. Dans l’état d’Adamawa, la minorité kanuri, principalement des commerçants de la capitale de l’Etat, Yola, a mis sur pied sa propre CJTF de 300 hommes en mars 2013.
Quand, à la fin de 2014, Boko Haram a menacé Yola, les confréries de chasseurs de diverses communautés et ethnies se mobilisèrent et furent fortement soutenues par les autorités de l’Etat et par les élites locales. Comme d’autres groupes de défense civile, ces unités ont effectué des missions de renseignement et de surveillance, ont patrouillé sur les routes et gardé des postes de contrôle. Leurs connaissances locales leur ont permis d’identifier et d’inspecter les inconnus repérés dans les espaces publics vulnérables aux attaques, comme les mosquées et les marchés. Ils surveillaient et assuraient la sécurité des communautés déplacées par le conflit, y compris les presque deux millions de personnes qui se trouvaient dans les camps de déplacés internes dans le nord-est du Nigéria.
Les avantages des forces civiles sont nombreux. Leur connaissance des langues locales et des terroirs, tant d’un point de vue géographique que social, permettent aux forces de sécurité de mieux cibler leurs opérations. Les civils locaux ont une « meilleure perception de ce qui est normal et de ce qui ne l’est pas », ils peuvent ainsi détecter les menaces, comme les éventuels kamikazes. Ces forces peuvent établir un lien de confiance entre les forces de sécurité et les populations locales. L’affiliation à la CJTF peut également protéger ses membres contre l’armée et la police.
Cependant, les membres de ces forces et leurs communautés courent certains dangers. Dans l’état du Borno, où la grande majorité des pertes humaines de la CJTF ont été enregistrées, 680 membres de la CJTF ont été tués entre 2014 et la mi-2017. Les villes qui ont constitué des forces civiles ont également payé cher leur décision, car Boko Haram ciblait les chefs traditionnels et d’autres partisans de la CJTF. En juin 2013, le groupe a déclaré la « guerre totale » contre les jeunes de Maiduguri et de Damaturu « en raison de l’alliance conclue avec l’armée et la police nigériane pour combattre nos frères ».
Le nombre de pertes humaines a atteint un pic en 2013- 2014, en grande partie à cause de ces représailles. Certains membres de la force ont également utilisé leur rôle pour prendre leur revanche ou faire des profits. Un petit nombre de membres de la CJTF perçoivent une rémunération, d’autres dépendent d’un soutien hasardeux des autorités locales, des responsables politiques et des entrepreneurs. D’autres encore partageraient le butin volé par les forces armées à Boko Haram ou toucheraient une partie de l’aide fournie aux camps de déplacés.
Certains membres de comités de surveillance utiliseraient également leur statut privilégié et leur relative impunité à des fins criminelles, notamment pour le trafic de drogue et la vente de biens volés. D’autres activités s’apparentent à de l’extorsion en contrepartie de la protection, comme lorsque les membres de ces comités demandent des « dons » aux points de contrôle ou qu’ils imposent une taxe aux communautés locales. Les rapports sur les atrocités commises par la CJTF sont encore plus troublants.
En particulier au cours des premières années et au plus fort de la lutte pour chasser Boko Haram de Maiduguri, les membres des comités de vigilance se sont livrés à des exécutions sommaires, souvent de connivence avec l’armée. Dans une ville du sud de Borno, des membres des comités de vigilance auraient défilé en agitant sur des piques les têtes de 40 militants présumés de Boko Haram.
Nigeria’s 2019 Elections: Six States to Watch
Auteur (s): International Crisis Group (ICG)
Date of Publication: 2018
Nigerian elections are high-stakes affairs often marred by street clashes and worse. As the 2019 contests approach, the risk of disturbances is particularly high in six states. The government and its foreign partners can limit campaign-related violence by enhancing security and promoting dialogue among rivals.
Principal Findings
What’s new? As presidential, gubernatorial and legislative elections draw near in Nigeria, the risk of violence is widespread, particularly in six states where stakes are high or other conflicts fester.
Why does it matter? Nigeria’s last three elections have been deadly. More than 100 people died during and after the 2015 polls – and those were peaceful compared to the previous two. In 2019, with parts of the country in turmoil, violence could take more lives and jeopardise the country’s stability.
What should be done? The Nigerian government should move to defuse tensions, bolstering police deployments in vulnerable states and fostering dialogue between antagonists. Nigeria’s foreign partners should monitor hotspots and warn politicians of consequences for inciting violence.
Electoral politics in Nigeria is a brutal affair with a winner-takeall ethos and a history of violence, often driven by local as much as national dynamics. Already there have been incidents of violence, with some states displaying particularly troubling signs ahead of the vote. In such hotspots, the Nigerian authorities should enhance security plans; encourage rivals to pledge jointly to campaign and resolve disputes peacefully; sanction politicians using inflammatory rhetoric or inciting violence; and promote local dialogue in states suffering intercommunal strife.
Recent Nigerian elections have all been violent, the 2011 polls particularly so. More than 800 people died, as post-election protests morphed into mob attacks on minorities in twelve northern states. Even the more peaceful 2015 polls saw scores killed during campaigning and after the vote. A range of factors conspire to heighten risks of bloodshed nationwide around next year’s vote.
These include the “win or die” attitude of many politicians, acrimony between the two major parties as they head into what appears likely to be a closely fought contest, widespread popular distrust of security agencies, opposition parties’ misgivings about the electoral commission’s neutrality, and the prevalence of conflict and deadly criminal violence in parts of the country.
Risks of violence appear to be highest in six states: Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Adamawa. Dynamics in each state vary, but all feature at least two of four major triggers: an intense struggle between the APC and PDP for control over states with large electorates, vast public revenues or symbolic electoral value; local rivalry between former and incumbent governors; tension resulting from ethnoreligious or herder-farmer conflict; and the presence of criminal groups that politicians can recruit to attack rivals and their constituents.
Local violence is not only a problem for the areas affected. It can have wider implications, with pre-election bloodshed undermining the vote’s credibility and aggravating risks of disputes, and local protests after the ballot potentially ballooning into a national crisis.
Electoral politics in Nigeria is a brutal affair with a winner-takeall ethos and a history of violence, often driven by local as much as national dynamics
At the national level, Nigerian authorities can take a number of steps to reduce risks. The federal government should speedily release all funds that are outstanding from the allocations that the federal legislature, the National Assembly, approved for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and security agencies but that are still stuck in the bureaucracy, to let them prepare for the elections properly. Political parties should fulfil commitments their leaders have recently made to avoid inflammatory rhetoric, campaign peacefully, pursue grievances lawfully and rein in any supporters in the event of their defeat.
The electoral authorities should intensify outreach to political parties aimed at winning their confidence and firm up logistical arrangements, particularly for election day. Security agencies should act professionally, ensure neutrality between all parties, and finalise contingency plans for preventing or responding to violence. In addition to these national-level steps, the authorities should redouble efforts to prevent violence in hotspots. While policies should be tailored to each state, priorities include:
Improving security arrangements by identifying and sanctioning politicians and groups using inflammatory rhetoric, inciting violence or plotting to perpetrate it; ensuring order at campaign rallies; strengthening inter-agency cooperation; and protecting polling centres in a non-partisan and non-threatening manner;
Encouraging leading politicians at the state and local levels to honour commitments, already made at the national level, to campaign and pursue any grievances peacefully and lawfully (ideally, the main rivals in conflict-prone states would make joint pledges to do so in public ceremonies);
- Holding confidence-building dialogues between the local leaders of ethnic, religious and farmer-herder communities that are locked in conflict, as a way to undercut efforts by politicians to stoke divides for their own ends.
For their part, Nigeria’s international partners, through their diplomatic missions in the federal capital, Abuja, should set up a forum to coordinate their messaging, particularly to the main political contenders and electoral and security institutions. They should consider establishing an international working group, comprising prominent statespersons with sway in Nigeria, which could intervene in the event of a major crisis.
Such a forum and working group helped lower tension and ensure a peaceful transition around the 2015 elections. Those sending observers should pay particular attention to hotspots. Diplomats also could warn state-level politicians, many of whom travel frequently abroad, that those responsible for inciting violence could face travel bans, asset freezes and other targeted sanctions.
Herdsmen crisis underscores Nigeria’s complex security threats
Author (s) : Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
Date of Publication: 2018
In April, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari announced that he would run for a second term in the 2019 presidential election. This came despite mixed reviews about his first term, and his record in office gives his critics plenty of metaphorical sticks with which to beat him.
There’s the dire state of the economy, with low oil prices resulting in sluggish growth and spiralling unemployment. The country only pulled itself out of a recession in the second quarter of 2017, but recent figures suggest the trajectory is slightly downwards again. Global economic headwinds mean this is not all Buhari’s fault, but nonetheless some pledges from his previous election campaign remain unfulfilled (such as the one to create three million new jobs).
There’s also the failure to defeat Boko Haram, despite numerous pledges from senior government and military officials that the Islamist militant group has been vanquished. A tough security response to Boko Haram was a central plank of Buhari’s 2014 campaign, but the group has proved remarkably resilient. It continues to attack cities and towns in north-eastern Nigeria and military positions.
Yet despite the severity of each of these problems, Buhari is facing an even more serious challenge: extreme violence in Nigeria’s central belt between farmers and herdsmen. His response to this issue may ultimately come to define his first term in office.
From the way it is told by hyperbolic southern Nigerian columnists, the Nigerian state has never encountered an enemy as fearsome as the Fulani herdsman. They are the ‘heathen hordes that seek to conquer and enslave our people’ as they rape, murder and pillage their way across the country, says one. They are ‘obsessed to conquer the South and take it from the ancestral owners’, says another. Even literary legend Wole Soyinka describes them as ‘marauders’ who ‘swoop on sleeping settlements’ and whose ‘weapon is undiluted terror’.
So who exactly are the Fulani, and why are they accused of wreaking such havoc?
The Fulani are an ethnic group, thought to be the largest in the Sahel with a population of 20 to 30 million. Traditionally the Fulani are semi-nomadic cattle herders, and communities would travel vast distances along grazing routes to find places for their herds to eat.
In Nigeria, the Fulani are mostly concentrated in the north. But a combination of political instability and drought is pushing them further and further south, where they are coming into conflict with local farming communities. Over the past few years, tensions between farmers and herdsmen have risen sharply, as has violence between the groups.
As Buhari prepares his re-election campaign, there is little doubt that the violence in Nigeria’s central areas is going to dominate the national discourse
The conflict ‘has increasingly ethnic (Fulani vs other Nigerian ethnicities), religious (Muslim herders vs Christian south), and cultural (nomadic vs sedentary) dimensions’, says Dr Roudabeh Kishi, director of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which monitors and maps conflict.
According to ACLED’s data, Fulani ethnic militias were responsible for 217 civilian fatalities between January and April this year, with March being an especially violent month. In contrast, Boko Haram – among the most dangerous terrorist groups on the continent – killed 78 civilians in the same period.
‘Fulani attacks on farmers are primarily practical rather than ideological; competition for suitable grazing land over the autumn and winter months. Though this has historically been seen as a reoccurring seasonal problem for many of the area’s farming communities, last month’s uncharacteristic level of violence has demanded attention of the national government and military,’ says Kishi.
So far, Buhari’s government has been slow to respond, with the Fulani issue receiving far less attention and resources than Boko Haram. Critics suggest that this is because Buhari is himself a Fulani, and is therefore unwilling to clamp down on members of his own ethnic group…
As Buhari prepares his re-election campaign, there is little doubt that the violence in Nigeria’s central areas is going to dominate the national discourse. But to lay all the blame on ethnic Fulani militias is to miss the point. They are a symptom of a much broader problem – and, to contain the violence, a much broader, multifaceted response is required.