WATHI propose une sélection de documents sur le contexte économique, social et politique du Libéria. Chaque document est présenté sous forme d’extraits qui peuvent faire l’objet de légères modifications. Les notes de bas ou de fin de page ne sont pas reprises dans les versions de WATHI. Nous vous invitons à consulter les documents originaux pour toute citation et tout travail de recherche.
MINUL, Mission des Nations Unies au Libéria
Nations Unies
http://www.un.org/fr/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml
Historique
1989 – 1997
La guerre civile au Libéria a coûté la vie à près de 150 000 personnes, des civils pour la plupart, et a provoqué un effondrement total de l’ordre public. Des milliers de personnes ayant été déplacées à l’intérieur du Libéria et hors de ses frontières, quelque 850 000 personnes se sont réfugiées dans les pays voisins. Les combats ont commencé à la fin de l’année 1989 et au début de l’année 1990, causant plusieurs centaines de morts lors des affrontements entre les forces gouvernementales et les combattants se réclamant d’un groupe d’opposition, le Front national patriotique du Libéria (NPFL), dirigé par un ancien membre du Gouvernement, Charles Taylor.
Dès le début du conflit, la Communauté économique des États d’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO), une organisation sous-régionale, a pris diverses initiatives en vue de parvenir à un règlement pacifique du conflit. L’ONU a appuyé l’action menée par la CEDEO pour mettre fin à la guerre civile, notamment la création du Groupe d’observateurs militaires de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ECOMOG) en 1990. En 1992, le Conseil de sécurité a imposé au Libéria un embargo sur les armes et le Secrétaire général a nommé un représentant spécial chargé de faciliter les pourparlers entre la CEDEAOet les belligérants.
Après la signature de l’accord de paix de Cotonou (Bénin) en 1993, négocié grâce à la médiation de la CEDEAO, le Conseil de sécurité a créé la Mission d’observation des Nations Unies au Libéria (MONUL), qui avait pour mandat notamment de contrôler le respect de l’accord de paix, et d’en vérifier l’application impartiale par toutes les parties. La MONUL a été la première mission de maintien de la paix que l’Organisation des Nations Unies a entreprise en coopération avec une mission de maintien de la paix déjà mise sur pied par une autre organisation.
Toutefois, des retards dans l’application des accords et la reprise des combats entre factions libériennes ont fait qu’il n’y a pas eu d’élections en février/mars 1994, comme prévu. Au cours des mois suivants, plusieurs accords supplémentaires, amendant et précisant certaines dispositions de l’accord de Cotonou ont été négociés. Grâce au cessez-le-feu en vigueur, les Nations Unies ont pu observer le déroulement des élections de juillet 1997. Après avoir été intronisé, le 2 août 1997, le Président Taylor a formé un nouveau gouvernement et annoncé la mise en oeuvre de mesures de réconciliation et d’unité nationale. L’objectif principal de la MONUL avait été atteint.
1997 – 2003
En novembre 1997, le mandat de la MONUL s’étant achevé le 30 septembre, l’ONU a créé le Bureau d’appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix au Libéria (BANUL) , dirigé par un représentant du Secrétaire général. Sa tâche principale était d’aider le Gouvernement à consolider la paix après la victoire du Président Charles Taylor dans les élections multipartites de juillet 1997.
Avec le plein appui du Conseil de sécurité, le BANUL a facilité la promotion de la réconciliation nationale et de la bonne gouvernance et il a aidé à mobiliser une assistance internationale en vue de l’exécution de programmes de reconstruction et de développement. Plus récemment, il s’est efforcé d’exécuter les tâches de son mandat révisé, approuvé par le Conseil de sécurité le 23 avril 2003. Aux termes de ce mandat révisé, et en plus de ses tâches initiales, le BANUL devait s’employer à aider le Gouvernement libérien à répondre aux besoins qu’il avait exprimés en ce qui concerne le renforcement de ses capacités dans le domaine des droits de l’homme et pour la préparation des élections, et élaborer une stratégie de consolidation de la paix intégrant les objectifs politiques, l’assistance aux programmes et des considérations relatives aux droits de l’homme.
Toutefois, les efforts de consolidation de la paix du BANUL ont été gravement compromis par le fait que le Gouvernement et les dirigeants de l’opposition se sont révélés incapables de surmonter leurs différends sur des questions clefs de gestion des affaires publiques. Entre-temps, la promotion de la réconciliation nationale a été affaiblie par les violations systématiques des droits de l’homme, l’exclusion et le harcèlement des opposants politiques et l’absence de réforme dans le secteur de la sécurité. Ces éléments ont contribué à la reprise de la guerre civile au Libéria et ont incité la communauté internationale à demander aux parties belligérantes d’essayer de parvenir à un règlement négocié du conflit.
Le 8 juillet 2003, alors que les combats entre les forces gouvernementales et plusieurs factions belligérantes s’intensifiaient et qu’on risquait d’assister à une tragédie humanitaire, le Secrétaire général a décidé de nommer Jacques Paul Klein (États-Unis) en tant que son Représentant spécial pour le Libéria (voir S/2003/695 ). Il lui a confié la tâche de coordonner les activités des organismes des Nations Unies au Libéria et d’appuyer les nouveaux arrangements transitoires. Le 29 juillet 2003, le Secrétaire général a décrit le déploiement en trois phases des troupes internationales au Libéria, aboutissant à la création d’une opération de maintien de la paix pluridimensionnelle des Nations Unies (voir S/2003/769 ). Il a également indiqué qu’à la suite de la nomination de M. Klein et de la création envisagée d’une opération des Nations Unies au Libéria, le mandat du BANUL devrait bien entendu s’achever.
Depuis lors, la situation au Libéria a évolué rapidement. Le 1er août 2003, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté la résolution 1497 (2003) , autorisant la mise en place d’une force multinationale au Libéria et déclarant qu’il était disposé à mettre en place une force de stabilisation de l’ONU qui serait déployée au plus tard le 1er octobre 2003. En outre, le 18 août 2003, les parties libériennes ont signé à Accra un accord de paix global, dans lequel les parties ont demandé à l’Organisation des Nations Unies de déployer une force au Libéria, en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, qui sera chargée d’appuyer le Gouvernement transitoire national du Libéria et de faciliter l’application de l’accord. Grâce au déploiement ultérieur de la Mission de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest au Libéria, la situation en matière de sécurité dans le pays s’est améliorée.
La résolution 875 (2003) du Conseil de sécurité donne un compte rendu détaillé des événements qui ont abouti à la création de la MINUL , notamment la démission du Président Taylor, le 11 août, et la manière pacifique dont s’est déroulée la passation des pouvoirs au Libéria .
Le déploiement d’une mission de maintien de la paix de l’ONU est recommandé
Le 11 septembre, le Secrétaire général a présenté un rapport contenant un aperçu de la situation générale dans le pays, ainsi que ses recommandations concernant le rôle que l’ONU peut jouer pour faciliter la mise en oeuvre effective de l’accord de paix global, notamment en ce qui concerne la taille, la structure et le mandat d’une opération de maintien de la paix au Libéria.
Le Secrétaire général a recommandé que le Conseil de sécurité, agissant en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte, autorise le déploiement d’une opération de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies dotée d’effectifs d’un maximum de 15 000 hommes, dont 250 observateurs militaires, 160 officiers d’état-major et un maximum de 875 membres de la police de l’ONU, 5 unités armées constituées supplémentaires fortes chacune de 120 personnes, ainsi que d’une composante civile de taille appréciable et du personnel d’appui requis.
La MINUL serait une opération pluridimensionnelle comportant des volets politique, militaire, police , justice pénale, affaires civiles, droits de l’homme, parité hommes-femmes, protection de l’enfance, DDR, information et soutien ainsi que, le moment venu, un volet électoral. Elle comporterait un mécanisme de coordination de ses activités avec celles des organismes humanitaires et de la communauté du développement. Elle agirait en étroite coordination avec la CEDEAO et l’Union africaine. Afin d’assurer une action coordonnée des Nations Unies face aux nombreux problèmes de la sous-région, la Mission travaillerait également en étroite collaboration avec la MINUSIL, la MINUCI et le Bureau des Nations Unies pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest.
Placée sous la direction d’un Représentant spécial, la Mission serait responsable de ses propres activités ainsi que de celles du système des Nations Unies au Libéria. Le Représentant spécial serait secondé par une équipe de gestion composée notamment de deux adjoints, d’un commandant de la force ayant le grade de général de corps d’armée, et d’un commissaire de police.
Un conseiller hors classe pour la parité hommes-femmes, épaulé par des collaborateurs, fera partie du Bureau du Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général et sera chargé de l’intégration d’une perspective sexospécifique dans les différents piliers du Bureau, ainsi que dans le contexte de la société civile et d’autres partenaires extérieurs. Par ailleurs, un conseiller pour le VIH/sida, également épaulé par des collaborateurs, sera adjoint au Bureau du Représentant spécial pour coordonner les activités de prévention de la transmission du VIH parmi le personnel civil et militaire de la Mission et les communautés locales.
Dans son rapport, le Secrétaire général a fait observer que la passation des pouvoirs du Président Taylor au Vice-Président Blah et la signature, par les parties libériennes, de l’accord de paix global offraient une occasion unique de mettre un terme aux souffrances du peuple libérien et de trouver une solution pacifique à un conflit qui avait été l’épicentre de l’instabilité dans la sous-région. Il a souligné que si l’Organisation des Nations Unies et la communauté internationale dans son ensemble étaient prêtes à soutenir le processus de paix libérien, c’était aux parties libériennes elles-mêmes qu’incombait la responsabilité première de la réussite de l’accord de paix.
Création de la MINUL
Le 19 septembre 2003, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté à l’unanimité la résolution 1509 (2003) remerciant le Secrétaire général de son rapport du 11 septembre 2003 et de ses recommandations. Il a décidé que la MINUL comprendrait 15 000 membres du personnel militaire des Nations Unies, dont un maximum de 250 observateurs militaires et 160 officiers d’état-major, et jusqu’à 1 115 fonctionnaires de la police de l’ONU, dont des unités constituées pour prêter leur concours au maintien de l’ordre sur tout le territoire du Libéria, ainsi que la composante civile appropriée. La Mission a été créée pour une période de 12 mois. Il a prié le Secrétaire général d’assurer le 1er octobre 2003 la passation des pouvoirs des forces de l’ECOMIL dirigées par la CEDEAO à la MINUL .
Comme prévu, la Mission des Nations Unies au Libéria (MINUL ) a assuré les fonctions de maintien de la paix des forces de la Mission de la CEDEAO au Libéria (ECOMIL) le 1er octobre. Les quelque 3 500 soldats ouest-africains qui avaient fait partie des troupes avancées de l’ECOMIL ont provisoirement coiffé un béret de soldat de la paix des Nations Unies. Dans un communiqué paru le même jour, le Secrétaire général a accueilli avec satisfaction cette très importante évolution et a salué le rôle joué par la CEDEAO dans l’instauration du climat de sécurité qui a ouvert la voie au déploiement de la MINUL . Il a rendu hommage aux Gouvernements du Bénin, de la Gambie, de la Guinée-Bissau, du Mali, du Nigéria, du Sénégal et du Togo pour leur contribution à la MINUL , ainsi qu’aux États-Unis pour leur appui à la force régionale. Le Secrétaire général s’est dit confiant que la MINUL serait en mesure de contribuer de manière importante au règlement du conflit au Libéria pour autant que toutes les parties concernées coopèrent pleinement avec elle et que la communauté internationale fournisse les ressources nécessaires.
LIBERIA DOCUMENT DE STRATEGIE PAYS 2013-2017
GROUPE DE LA BANQUE AFRICAINE DE DEVELOPPEMENT
La situation sécuritaire est demeurée généralement stable, bien que fragile et sensible à la volatilité politique dans la région. Le gouvernement devra relever les défis liés à des responsabilités accrues en matière de sécurité et à l’augmentation des dépenses, car la force de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies, qui compte 10 000 soldats et policiers, se propose de réduire de moitié son effectif d’ici 2015. Dans le cadre de la transition et conformément à la politique de décentralisation, cinq centres régionaux de justice et de sécurité devront être ouverts dans le pays, et le premier de ces centres a été effectivement mis en place en février 2013. Le conflit ayant éclaté après les élections de 2011 en Côte d’Ivoire a entraîné un afflux de plus de 200 000 réfugiés au Liberia, dont 60 000 se trouvaient toujours au Liberia en mars 2013. Les violences périodiques persistent à la frontière ivoirienne, après les attaques meurtrières d’août 2012 et les escarmouches de janvier et mars 2013.
Partnering for sustainable peace in Liberia
Amanda Lucey and Liezelle Kumalo, Institute for Security Studies, Center on International Cooperation , Peace Research Institute Oslo
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper302.pdf
Liberia is at a pivotal point in its transition to a peaceful democracy. In October 2017 the country will have its first ‘open seat’ elections. The incumbent, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, will step down and hand over power to the leader of one of the 22 political parties that are currently participating in the election. Moreover, despite security fears for the elections, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has downsized from over 15 000 military troops in 2007 to around 1 000 soldiers in 2016 (see Figure 1). It will continue to draw down in 2017 in recognition of Liberia’s growing ownership of its own transition.
The country has made steady progress in transitioning from decades of civil conflict into a new democracy. It has instituted a number of legal reforms, national strategies and peacebuilding activities to address the root causes of violence. Liberia has been receiving support from the United Nations’ (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) since 2010, but its institutions still need to be supported to consolidate their democracy gains. The 2015 review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture argued that, for the peacebuilding components of peace operation mandates to be more UNSC), the PBC and UN Country Teams. It also stated that the PBC could play an enhanced role in advising the UNSC on the diverse range of views from the full spectrum of international peace, security and development tools and actors, and in developing practical and context-specific solutions. Finally, the PBC could be instrumental in bringing together various stakeholders, both from New York and from the field, to mobilise peacebuilding support to conflict-affected countries.
Key national strategies
Liberia’s initial post-conflict vision, Liberia Rising 2030, was that of an equitable, diverse and democratically stable country. It also emphasised the need for a competitive private sector economy with people-focused investment policies.9 The Agenda for Transformation (2012–2017) was derived from this vision, and was adopted as a five-year plan. It focuses on four pillars: peace, security, and the rule of law; economic transformation; human development; and governance and public institutions. There is also a crosscutting pillar that takes into account additional issues such as youth empowerment and gender equality. Another important document is the Liberian Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation (2012–2030).10 This roadmap is composed of 12 thematic components divided into three areas: accounting for the past, managing the present and planning for the future.
It seeks to address some of the recommendations made in Liberia’s controversial Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report. As mentioned above, the SMC also details the commitments of the PBC and the Liberian government to address peacebuilding priorities. While these documents form the basis of Liberia’s national peacebuilding frameworks, research suggests more must be done to form a social compact between the government and civil society (particularly in the counties).11 The 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture noted that for a country to obtain true ownership of its peacebuilding processes it must engage all spheres of society, a practice known as ‘inclusive national ownership’.12 One way of doing this is through national dialogues that give citizens a stronger voice in the future direction of Liberia.
What can the AU, ECOWAS and the MRU contribute to Liberia?
The AU, ECOWAS and the MRU have all been present in Liberia for a considerable amount of time, and will continue to be there in the future. In an effort to find ‘African solutions to African problems’ they have all progressed in developing their institutional capacities to address conflicts. The MRU is the least developed of all these organisations in terms of building peace and security, mainly because its contributions come from member states that have all gone through wars and are only now revitalising their economies. A history of mistrust between member states may also have contributed to teething problems but, as noted below, the organisation has gone to great lengths to address cross-border issues despite resource constraints.
The AU, on the other hand, has received more funding, which has allowed it to make significant headway in developing its Peace and Security Architecture. Its Peace and Security Council is supported by five pillars: the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund. The AU has developed a post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) framework and unit to address peacebuilding challenges and has a complementary structure – the African Governance Architecture – to address issues relating to democracy. While it is also increasingly acknowledging the importance of conflict prevention, in the past it often relied on peacekeeping interventions.
Similarly, ECOWAS has demonstrated its commitment to peace and security on the continent and has made greater strides than many other African subregional organisations. Its interventions have traditionally been focussed on peacekeeping, although it also has frameworks that acknowledge the importance of conflict prevention. Currently it is considering a PCRD framework to address challenges in the region. ECOWAS has recently demonstrated its strength and commitment to democracy through its engagements after the 2016 Gambian elections, showing that it is willing to enforce a lawful transition of power. These actors are particularly important in sustaining peace in Liberia and can assist in a number of areas in which traditional donors struggle to gain a foothold.
The AU, ECOWAS and the MRU have in the past beencriticised for a lack of funding and relying on traditional donors to supplement member state contributions. It is precisely a critical attitude that has often led The SMC acknowledges the need to engage with the AU, ECOWAS and the MRU in Liberia, but what is their precise comparative advantage? The first obvious advantage is that these organisations are all (either partially or fully) composed of neighbouring countries. They therefore have a long-term and sustained interest in Liberia, whose instability would have a negative impact on their own stability.
The negative spill-over effects from Liberia were particularly evident during its Ebola crisis, and led to quick reactions from all three organisations. Neighbouring countries often have similar cultural, social and political overlaps that are relevant in finding localised solutions. Furthermore, these countries have incentives to develop cross-border initiatives such as combatting drug trafficking. While in the past there have been allegations of neighbouring countries’ assisting rebel groups in Liberia to further their own interests and therefore acting as sources of Liberia’s instability, this is no longer the case, according to a number of stakeholders.
Practical implementation of Liberia’s peacebuilding priorities
Elections
As noted in the SMC, the 2017 elections are a priority focus area for Liberia’s peacebuilding process. On 1 July 2016 UNMIL handed security responsibilities to the Liberian National Police (LNP), although figures are still lower than what has been promised (5 101 rather than 8 000 personnel, and only 950 women). A total of 1.9 million people are expected to vote during the elections with 22 political parties contesting the elections, which poses a challenge to security.
The government has taken a number of precautions to ensure the elections are successful. It has committed to preparing a realistic budget for elections, increasing the representation of women, implementing a broad campaign of civic education and voter education, ensuring dialogues between security forces and the population at community level, ensuring the proper training of security forces and establishing a code of conduct between presidential candidates. However, the institutional capacity of the National Elections Commission (NEC) is weak.
This research has found that more needs to be done. According to the stakeholders interviewed, elections are personality driven and the majority of the political leaders have not spent enough time reflecting on party manifestos or policy development. There are also discussions on whether there should be a limit on the number of political parties allowed to run. However, while creating more stringent criteria for political parties may ensure that they are more committed, given Liberia’s history of exclusion this may present further problems. Furthermore, antagonism between politicians has led to violent clashes between supporters in Monrovia. There are concerns that the elections may create safety and security issues, which will stretch the capacity of the police.
During the interviews, many of the participants agreed that the first round of elections will likely not yield a clear winner and that this will lead to a second round of elections. Previous elections in Liberia have proven that this can be problematic, even when allegations of fraud are unfounded. In the 2017 elections it is likely that political parties will again be forced to reach a compromise with one another, and this may have implications for developing an overarching vision for the country. The media can also increase antagonism among the supporters of candidates and requires training. Although the elections are a priority for both the government of Liberia and external peacebuilding actors engaging in the country, there is no overarching strategy to ensure they run smoothly. Three main issues need to be addressed: the development of political parties’ vision and strategy, voter education and the positive use of the media as a force for peace.
Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia
United Nations, Security Council
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/386/15/PDF/N1638615.pdf?OpenElement
The Security Council, in its resolution 2239 (2015), affirmed its intention to consider the possible withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and transition to a future United Nations presence that would support the Government of Liberia in consolidating peace, based on the Council’s review of Liberia’s overall capacity to ensure stability and security conditions on the ground, and, in that regard, requested me to conduct an assessment mission to Liberia in order to provide recommendations.
That request was reiterated in resolution 2308 (2016), in which the Council extended the mandate of UNMIL until 31 December 2016 and requested me to include an update on the modalities for transferring to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) pursuant to resolution 2295 (2016) the quick reaction force established within the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) pursuant to resolution 2162 (2014). In accordance with those resolutions, a strategic assessment mission visited Liberia to assess the situation on the ground and consult with national and other stakeholders. The present report contains the findings of that assessment and my recommendations on the future of UNMIL.
Security situation
The security situation has remained stable since the completion of the handover of UNMIL security responsibilities to Liberian authorities on 30 June 2016. There has not been any incident requiring the armed intervention of UNMIL in 2016. Liberia has not faced a military threat for several years. However, risks are posed by civil unrest and mob violence, which ignite quickly and could escalate beyond the response capability of national security institutions, particularly if there are simultaneous incidents. Latent threats could exacerbate those risks, many of which led to the civil war, including ethnic and regional tensions, land disputes, economic inequality, and competition over natural resources, particularly in concession areas.
Violent crime, unregulated small arms, and cross-border trafficking in drugs, persons and weapons also present risks. Notwithstanding the assessment by the Liberia National Police of a low-to-medium risk of electionrelated violence, several interlocutors expressed concern about the large population of unemployed, unskilled youth who have nothing to lose by displaying antisocial behaviour and are vulnerable to manipulation by potential spoilers during the electoral period.
Capacity of national institutions to maintain stability
All interlocutors identified resource constraints as the biggest challenge facing the national security services; as a consequence, there are insufficient personnel, logistics and transport for timely response to security incidents, particularly in remote areas. Nearly 90 per cent of allocations for the security agencies are for salaries and recurrent costs, leaving little for operational and development-related expenditure or for reaching personnel targets. According to an adviser of the President, Liberian security agencies have achieved 70 per cent operational effectiveness, the gap of 30 per cent being attributable to the need for logistics and continued training.
Security sector governance based on civilian oversight and human security has improved. A national security strategy developed in 2008 is under review. The legal framework for the security sector is being established, including the enactment of legislation on the control of firearms and ammunition. On 4 October 2016, the President approved legislation for the police and immigration services that provides for the establishment of civilian complaint and policy management boards and other oversight and accountability mechanisms. There have also been advances in decentralizing services, including the deployment of security personnel outside of Monrovia and the establishment of county and district security councils. Ninety-five per cent of weapons held by security personnel have been marked and registered by the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms. Implementing the legislative framework and continuing to develop the security services will require more investment; allocations for all agencies marginally increased in the budget for 2016/17.
Armed Forces of Liberia
The Armed Forces of Liberia, which comprises 2,236 personnel, 4 per cent of whom are women, has primary responsibility for defending the country against external aggression and insurgency. There are constitutional limits on its role in internal security set out in article 85 of the Constitution and the 2008 National Defense Act of Liberia.
In August 2016, the United States of America concluded its training and mentoring programme for the Armed Forces of Liberia, considering the task of creating a professional and credible army to have been successfully completed. The United States still provides support for strengthening defence institutions, professional development, maritime security, engineering support and medical readiness. ECOWAS is also mentoring the Armed Forces of Liberia. The army is well trained and equipped, but lacks experience, having been newly established in Negative perceptions remain, although the army comprises mostly new recruits who were vetted by the United States and are not associated with the Armed Forces of Liberia that was a party to the civil war. The army has taken steps to ensure that it represents the entire country and to demonstrate that it is a “force for good”.
The army faces operational challenges due to insufficient funding, which hampers its ability to deploy quickly or sustain operations outside of Monrovia. Notwithstanding those challenges, the army continues to engage in joint training and exercises with the Liberia National Police and other security agencies
The coastguard has 50 personnel and the capacity to patrol up to 150 nautical miles from Monrovia. It has a limited operational role because it lacks personnel. In both the army and the coastguard, attrition is high and discipline has been an issue. Development is constrained by limited opportunities and resources to conduct the exercises required to sustain training and develop skills.
State of Peace, Reconciliation and Conflict in Liberia
Catholic Relief Services
https://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/state-of-peace-reconciliation-liberia_0.pdf
Liberia Today: Context and challenges
Since the end of the civil war, Liberians have successfully carried out two peaceful democratic elections, which restored a measure of confidence in the institutions of government and proved that differences can be resolved through peaceful political competition at the polls. If Liberia repeats this success in 2017, it will mark the first democratic transfer of power from an elected incumbent to an elected executive since 1944, as current President Johnson-Sirleaf steps down at the end of her constitutional mandate.
One of the main challenges is how to turn the negative peace into positive peace. The war trauma is still fresh, and the historical and systemic drivers that fueled the war are still present. Reconciliation did not reach deeply and widely enough to rebuild the torn relationships within and between ethno-regional groups. In the eyes of many Liberians, the elites manipulated the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to absolve themselves of wrongdoing and to gain political advantages.
PEACE AND CONFLICT
The current peace is greatly valued, but seen as “negative” and fragile: Liberians cherish the past 13 years of peace; however, they speak in terms of “silence of the guns” or “cessation of hostilities” rather than the positive elements of peace, such as ethnic integration, harmonious inter-communal relationships, civil conduct, mutual trust and civic pride. In surveys, two-thirds of respondents characterized Liberia as largely peaceful, but subsequent questions and key informant interviews revealed that peace is equated with the temporary absence of violence, with 66.3% describing the current peace as “negative”. In short, Liberians view the peace as tentative, fragile and volatile.
This assessment is not surprising, because the fundamental problems that fueled the violent conflict are still there—corruption in public services, AmericoLiberian dominance over politics and the economy, marginalization of the indigenous populations, limited economic opportunity, and restricted participation in decisionmaking and access to influence for the average person.
More troubling perhaps is that the conflict opened new fault lines. Respondents identified corruption (85.9%), land disputes (83.7%), and high youth unemployment (79.8%) as the most potent conflict trigger factors. Alliances of convenience for profit, greed and survival during the civil war have made bitter rivals of formerly amicable ethnic groups. Once bridgeable differences over land and resources now constitute major barriers to dialog and civility, as families and communities engage in endless disputes over land boundaries and titles as well as agro-forestry and mining concessions. Trust and mutuality are hindered by weak institutions and lack of common norms and pathways for citizens and government to interact.
Postwar reconciliation in Liberia is incomplete and shallow:
Although Liberians acknowledge that gains have been made in reconciliation and healing, the vast majorityremain convinced that the main perpetrators of violence escaped punishment, and that the victims of violence have largely been denied justice. Notably, more than 80% of respondents do not believe that people who suffered from the war received justice through Truth and Reconciliation Commission processes, and while half believe that post-war reconciliation failed to achieve its objectives. Respondents in Rivercress and Montserrado counties had a more pessimistic view, with 60% expressing scepticism regarding reconciliation. Key informants felt that national peace and reconciliation had the weakest impact on the grassroots level, where efforts were too piecemeal and shallow to obtain more than superficial buy-in from communities. A degree of healing can be attributed to the passage of time, which has cooled tensions and emotions.
Renewed violent conflict can be prevented, but the risk of recidivism is high:
Respondents were fairly evenly split on whether Liberia could again descend into large-scale violent conflict (50.6% “high to very high risk” and 43.7% “zero to low risk”). Those who were more optimistic believed that Liberians were too tired and disillusioned with war to return to fighting. The others cited high levels of public corruption, contentious land disputes and high rates of youth unemployment as drivers for fresh outbreaks of violence. Also, attempts by some politicians to declare Liberia a Christian state were seen as a destabilizing force, with the potential to unleash violence. Political leaders (71.8%) and unemployed youth (58.2%) topped the list of potential conflict instigators. Owing to historical and current drivers, respondents identified Nimba (28%), Montserrado (21%), and Grand Gedeh (17%) counties as potential flashpoints where local conflict can erupt and spread. Feelings of insecurity and the fear of relapse into mass violence were most pronounced in River Cess (79.3%), Nimba (74.9%), Grand Kru (74.4%) and Grand Cape Mount (74.2%).
MEDIUM TO LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS:
PEACE AND CONFLICT
- Institutionalize a culture of a peace through education programs in schools and communities Respondents repeatedly mentioned that the war entrenched a culture of violence in Liberian society. They highlighted the need for re-establishing a culture of peace and “deprogramming” the wartime values and mindsets, especially among young people. To promote this transformation, it is recommended that CSOs:
1.1 Develop peace and education activities focused on young people: Various types of youth-centered activities such as sports, music, drama and youth clubs should be supported in communities across the country. Youth camps can be organized to rebuild community infrastructure, create opportunities to heal and to re-establish a sense of self-worth.
LIBERIA: HOW SUSTAINABLE IS THE RECOVERY?
International Crisis Group
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/177-liberia-how-sustainable-is-the-recovery.pdf
SECURITY IN THE SHORT AND MID-TERM
Security has improved steadily since 2006. However, lingering threats of violent crime and regional troubles make successful security sector reform still a priority. The fate of Charles Taylor continues to preoccupy public attention. A verdict in his $89 million trial at the Special Court for Sierra Leone in The Hague is expected in August 2011, barely two months before the elections. The ex-president reportedly still has a strong following (though few will admit openly to being part of it). His party, the NPP, is part of the new Democratic Alliance, though prominent members have recently defected.101 Many are hopeful that he will be convicted, as his return could undermine the peace process.
Violent protests cannot be ruled out, even if the elections are credible, but an Ivorian-like post-electoral tragedy is not looming. UNMIL is still primarily responsible for security, though it assisted the Liberia National Police (LNP) in developing an integrated security and contingency plan for the elections. The performance of the police and the security agencies more generally during the electoral period will provide indications of how close they are to being able to assume full responsibility from UNMIL. This section focuses, however, not on the specific plans for the elections but rather security sector reform more generally, including the judiciary.
THE STATE OF THE REFORMED SECURITY SECTOR
Army
In January 2011, President Johnson Sirleaf declared inadequate an initial projection of a total force of 2,000 troops and announced plans to recruit at least 300 more soldiers and expand infrastructure for the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The government officially assumed responsibility for the army from the U.S. in January, but it is difficult to judge the institution’s quality, since it will not be fully functional before mid-2012.104 However, reports of misconduct and desertions owing to poor working conditions raise concern about the sustainability of reforms.
On 14 February, Defence Minister Brownie Samukai cited a 14 per cent attrition rate, including death and dismissal. An interlocutor remarked that poor remuneration and “dehumanising treatment” have eroded a sense of commitment among some AFL members, who will not hesitate to leave once better opportunities are available.106 Under such conditions, the value of a recruitment exercise would be questionable.
Police
Police reform is something of a mixed bag. Basic training of the LNP is completed, but a range of problems threatens to reverse gains. Amid reports of exemplary behaviour are stories of corruption and human rights abuses. There have been reports of police renting their uniforms to armed robbers, demanding bribes at checkpoints, brutalising members of the media – one alleged instance involved members of the president’s security detail – and botching a statutory rape case involving a thirteen-year-old girl. A report by Search for Common Ground found that police are “routinely seen drunk and acting unethically”.
Many collect bribes from arrested criminals before releasing them to roam the streets at night and run errands for them. A March 2011 clampdown on demonstrating students showed bad habits die hard, despite the president’s declaration two months earlier that police “heavy handedness” is a thing of the past. At the same time, the force has suffered its share of abuse. Over 4,000 officers have been trained, including the armed Emergency Response Unit (ERU) and the specialised Police Support Unit (PSU).113 623 (15 per cent) of these officers are women. At a ratio to population of 1:850114 and with 65-70 per cent deployed in Montserrado county alone, there are clearly not enough officers to cover the whole country. The ERU, set up in 2008 to combat spiralling armed robbery, is functional and appears efficient, though based on revised needs assessments, it has only 344 officers instead of the originally targeted 500.116 The PSU is meant to have 600 members by December.
Source photo : afrique-tv.info