Executive Summary

Chadian President Idriss Déby-Itno, who had just been elected for his sixth term, passed away in late April 2021 under unclear circumstances while visiting troops fighting against the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, a politico-military movement advancing toward the capital.

According to the constitution, the president of parliament was supposed to serve as interim president and organize new elections within 90 days. However, the Transitional Military Council, led by Déby’s son Mahamat, seized power immediately, disregarding the constitutional process and raising concerns about a potential dynastic power grab by the Déby clan. 

The period under review was dominated by the ongoing transition, characterized by tensions between the political elite and the political and civil oppositions.

History and Characteristics of Transformation

In the 1990s, Chad began its journey toward economic and political transformation following a devastating civil war. However, conflict lines between the Muslim north and the Christian/Animist south continue to define the country’s political landscape. Idriss Déby-Itno, an ethnic Zaghawa and former army chief of staff, came to power through a coup d’état in 1990 and remained in power until his death in 2021.

In 2015, Chad experienced terrorist attacks from Boko Haram for the first time. In March 2020, the Chadian army suffered a major defeat attributed to Boko Haram. Déby carried out punitive actions against civilians in the Lake Chad region. Chad’s military actively participates in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria and joined the Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel (G5 Sahel) to combat terrorism.

Transformation Status 

• Political Transformation 

Stateness

Citizenship and access to citizenship are not politically relevant issues. Apart from administrative shortcomings, there are few problems with access to citizenship. All citizens formally have the same civil rights. Following the French example, Chad is a secular state based on the principle of “laïcité,” noted in the first article of all its constitutions since independence, as well as in the two transitional charters since Déby’s death that guarantee the separation of state and religion. Nevertheless, a distinction can be made between Muslim and Christian attitudes toward secular power. 

Muslims (about 55 % of the population) dominated both Déby’s and his son’s government, as well as the transitional parliament. They are also overrepresented as government officials.

Since 2018 Chad’s administrative units comprise 23 provinces, 95 départements and 365 communes. The presence of state representatives does not mean that state services are also provided. Administrative structures are generally small, poorly funded, and highly susceptible to corruption at the expense of the population – be it in rural areas or the capital.

Basic infrastructure, especially access to sanitation and water is extremely poor: in 2020, only 10.1% of the population had access to improved sanitation facilities and less than half to an at least basic water source (46.2%). Only 5.6% can use a safely managed water source. Electricity is only available to 11.1% of the population. Basic health services can be found in towns. In remote areas, they are rare or nonexistent. Maternity and infant mortality rates are among the highest in the world. Basic schooling is provided but run and paid for by parents themselves.

Political Participation

Idriss Déby was elected for a sixth term with 79.3% of the vote in an election considered fraudulent and boycotted by the main opposition figures. As in the past, the government did not allow fair competition but instead worked to silence political dissent.

There were no democratic processes during the transition period and none are foreseen before the end of 2024. The president of the transition government appointed all officeholders. 

Previous constitutions – including the transitional constitution – provide for freedom of association and assembly. However, these rights, especially among opposition civil society groups and parties, were repeatedly restricted or suspended even before the beginning of the transition.

Demonstrations have long been prohibited and violently repressed, with beatings, arrests and even shootings, for example, in the run-up to the presidential election and after the death of former President Déby in 2021. The World Organization Against Torture Association expressed concern “about the violent repression of the peaceful demonstrations that took place on 20 October 2022, as part of a repressive governance system, where cases of extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances and massive arbitrary detentions were registered.”

Chad’s constitution allows for freedom of expression and of the press. These freedoms are, however, regularly curtailed and there is a persistent threat against those voicing criticism of the authorities. Only journalists who can provide proof of journalistic training are allowed to register with the Supreme Media Authority and work as journalists. Critical journalists, bloggers and other commentators continue to risk prosecution and imprisonment under the transitional authorities. 

Rule of Law

Since the death of Idriss Déby and the subsequent beginning of the transition period, there has been no official separation of powers. As defined in the transitional constitution, transitional President Déby appoints all position holders in politics, administration and the judiciary. 

The trial of those arrested during the demonstrations on October 20, 2022 proceeded without legal defense. On December 2, 2022, 262 accused were sentenced to two and three-year prison terms. Chad’s bar association denounced the process as a parody of justice.

The interim constitution guarantees civil rights. Like all other constitutions since independence, it enshrines the secular character of the state. It emphasizes the equality of men and women and prohibits propaganda of an ethnic, tribal, regional, or religious nature. De facto, however, civil rights exist only on paper. Women’s rights are routinely violated. The authorities rarely investigate cases of abuse or domestic violence, leaving women nowhere to seek protection. Homosexuality is generally considered incompatible with tradition and religion. With the Criminal Code of December 12, 2016, homosexuality was no longer classified as a crime but as a petty offense. The new penal code also prohibits underage marriages. 

The death penalty was abolished in 2014 but reauthorized for terrorist offenses after the Boko Haram attacks in 2015. On April 28, 2020, parliament again abolished the death penalty. 

Political and Social Integration

The old and new transitional constitutions recognize the existence of political parties. 

Some individuals close to the power elite have established parties in order to complicate the political landscape. 

Les Transformateurs has taken up the role of opposition, gaining in popularity among urban youth and enjoying strong support in southern regions. However, the party has never participated in elections. Its chairman, Succès Masra, hails from the Christian majority south, reflecting the pattern of Chadian politics such that parties and opposition are often tied to individuals and have ethno regional roots. 

Like the opposition parties, civil society is weak and fragmented.

Chad’s long history of violent intercultural conflicts means that there is very little trust among the population, and intercultural and interreligious tensions continue to persist under the surface. Generally, people organize along ethnic lines or according to religious identities. The general insecurity and dissatisfaction with the political figures who have joined the transition process, as well as increasing poverty, seem to have caused an increase in distrust since Déby’s death.

Governance

Level of Difficulty

Chad’s geographic location would be a burden on any government. It is a landlocked country situated in the Sahel region, meaning the transport of goods from the coasts is costly. Chad is surrounded by neighbors experiencing conflict. Natural constraints are high in the region and include environmental degradation, erratic rainfall, droughts and flooding. 

Chad is among the poorest countries in the world. However, many constraints are self-inflicted, such as bad governance and high levels of corruption. Energy supply is another area that poses serious constraints. The advent of oil production in 2003 had the potential to ease the economic situation of the country, help to diversify the economy and improve the poor educational and health systems. However, oil production is already beginning to decline, as was well known from the outset, and all indices are worse than before production began. The government has shown no political will to fight poverty. 

Civil society in Chad is weak and fragmented. Although there are no deep-rooted civil society traditions, human rights organizations and NGOs that focus on peaceful cohabitation (especially in conflicts between farmers and pastoral groups) and women’s and youth rights do important work. Chad is a highly conflictive society and cleavages exist along several lines. Some conflict lines have historical origins, but political power relations tend to intensify them. 

Governance Performance

International Cooperation

Chad is a member of different regional and subregional communities. The country has signed a number of international conventions. Chad has usually complied with the rules set by regional and international organizations. It is a member of the AU (since 2017 the Chadian Moussa Faki has been the chairperson of the AU Commission), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the Community of SahelSaharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Chad is part of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which came into force on January 1, 2021. Chad also participates in the G5 Sahel (since 2014), and together with Mauretania, Mali (now suspended), Niger, and Burkina Faso created the G5 joint force (since 2017). Chad provides the majority of the 8,000 soldiers of the joint Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the countries bordering Lake Chad, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria and conducts most of the cross-border missions to fight Boko Haram.

Strategic Outlook

Through the end of 2024, Chad will be in transition. According to the National Dialogue, elections are now scheduled to take place at the end of 2024. 

The brutal repression of protestors by security forces on October 20, 2022 and the subsequent imposition of a state of emergency make it increasingly difficult for the opposition to express itself publicly. 

Reforms are necessary in various sectors, such as education, health and infrastructure. However, considering Idriss Déby’s three-decade-long rule and the persistence of administrative and ruling structures, it is likely that a significant portion of the funds intended for improvement will be lost to corruption. 

Therefore, it is crucial to support the few democratic forces, civil society members, trade unions, journalists, internet bloggers and individuals who bravely voice their concerns. International mechanisms are needed to protect these individuals, particularly those facilitating the granting of travel visas.

The educational system should be adjusted to meet the basic needs of the population and support talented young people in studying abroad. Chad lags behind in development, even compared to regional peers, and risks being left behind in the long run. Adequate provision of health care services is also essential. International financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, along with other donors, should ensure that their funding reaches the intended target groups and is not susceptible to embezzlement within the patronage system. Economic diversification, improvement of the education and health care systems, food security and good governance measures should remain key priorities.