Authors: Paa Kwesi Wolseley Praha and Timothy Chanimbe
Site of publication: Taylor and Francis
Type of publication: Report
Date of publication: August 2021
Following the 9/11 attack, stringent security measures aimed at combating terrorist threats have been enforced by most countries around the world especially nations that have suffered terrorist attacks. Although national governments, experts, and scholars recognize the devastating impact of global terrorist attacks and the need for tighter security policies to combat it, devising precise strategy to counter terrorism is challen-ging due to the diverse context and situation-dependent nature of terrorism. Existing studies however reveal strategies that are general from the UN perspective, although they may or may not be applicable in certain situations. These strategies include but not limited to targeted assassination, collaborative security training, enhanced border control management, intelligence gathering and sharing. These are built solidly on the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, unanimously adopted in September 2006 by the UN General Assembly in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288).
These generalized counter-terrorism strategies are extracted from strategies deployed by countries that have suffered terrorist attacks to the neglect of those that have no experience of terrorism. Meanwhile systematic studies reveal that terrorists stop at nothing to spread their tentacles and thus, areno respecter of boundaries. In West Africa, the operations of terrorist groups [like Ansar ed-Din (Movement of the Defenders of the Faith), Boko Haram,Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), The Movement forUnity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Islamic Movement for Azawad(IMA) and Al-Mourabitoun] which were formerly confined to countries bordering the Sahel have now encroached deeper into West Africa.This has resulted in terrorist casualties in countries like Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, two of Ghana’s neighbors who had no prior historical exposure to terrorist attacks.
What is alarming is, although Ghana shares borders with these countries, it remains among the few countries in the sub-region that have not experienced terrorist attacks. However, its geographical location, i.e., nearness to terrorismprone countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria predisposes it to terrorist attacks. Again, Ghana’s cordial relations with the US leading to the government’s’ acceptance of two former Guantanamo Bay detainees and the 2018 signing of a military agreement with the U.S for the establishment of a quasi military base in Ghana’s capital Accra for counter terrorism deploy-ment in the sub region has brought Ghana ever closer to the attention of terrorist groups both in the sub region and beyond. Beyond these, the 2015 exposé on the recruitment of five Ghanaian youth by ISIS has since put the country in a precarious state and raised the security threat of the country.Furthermore, Ghana is engulfed in poor economic conditions, religious radic-alism, porous national boarders, proliferation of small and light weapons (SALW), illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, intra-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts, land rights, and other resource-drive common precipitants of terrorism in West Africa.
Despite these, the country is yet to record any veritable terrorist attacks. Based on the context-dependence nature of counter-terrorism strategies defying the generalization of counter-terrorism strategies,we explore why Ghana has not experienced terrorist attacks by examining the question: what measures are employed by Ghana’s security institutions to prevent terrorist attacks in the country? Gauging from this objective, three security institutions were relevant to this study based on their role, and possession of information as regards to countering terrorism. Theoretically Undergirded by the concept of National Security, we solicited information from personnel of the Ghana Police Service (GPS), the Ghana ImmigrationService (GIS), and the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) whose responses served as the primary data for this study.
Community engagement
Consistent with the Concept of National Security that implies the application of Defense Strategies of a state in the defence of the nation against territorial aggression from the sea, land or air by using all necessary strategies or approaches to prevent threats (Stone, 2009), Informants from GPS and GISarticulated that their agencies engaged communities as a strategy aimed at preventing terrorist attacks.
Community engagement is a very crucial counter-terrorism strategy of their respective agencies and are in concord with the findings of Spalek and Weeks (Citation2017) and Briggs (Citation2010) that the use of community engagement is based on the heightened recognition among counter-terrorism analysts in the post 9/11 period about the benefits broader public and community involvement can contribute in terrorism. Alternatively, the traditional law enforcement pursuits. There are however dynamics in informants’ responses giving their legally assigned roles, portfolios, organizational and functional differences, intra-organizational portfolios and the need to avoid intermeddling in functional duties etc.
On a point of divergence, another informant from the GPS intimated that community engagement is also needed for disarmament and arms control instead of de-radicalizing ideas or ideologies.
The necessity in the deployment of community engagement as a counter-terrorism by the GPS and GIS revealed by informants from these institutions buttresses Stephen Krasner’s observation that terrorists in their operations transit many communities and use these communities for multiple purposes such as identify recruit and radicalize vulnerable men and women with the needed psychological impetus and material incentives to become terrorists (Krasner, 1999). Thus, the need to positively engage local communities as equal partners if Ghana’s security from terrorism is to be sustain.
The application of security software BCM
The application of security 0k(((JJ Bsoftwares in BCM per the informants’ responsesprovides the GIS with a high rate of security success in the detection of suspected criminals. This is in consonance with the statement of theEuropean Group of Personalities in the field of Security that “technology itself cannot guarantee security, but security without the support of technology is impossible” ((EC), 2004). This statement thus espouses the contribution of information and communications technology (ICT) in the light of its realistic impact in countering terrorism. However, the security risk for Ghana as admitted by one of the research participants lies in the non-availability and use of the security software at all border crossing points of the country due to logistical and financial challenges as extracted from the response of informantG3 above. This confirms the position of Agbemabiesse (2011) and Salter thatGhana security agencies lack the necessary logistical support in the perfor-mance of their mandated duties.