Situation analysis 

The Republic of Chad is a landlocked country in north central Africa and a home to over 1501 different ethnic and linguistic groups. 

Chad has been in a state of almost constant instability and protracted conflict since achieving independence in 1960. The legitimacy of President Idriss Déby Itno’s government is being strongly contested on both political and socio economic fronts. It experiences recurrent political violence which revolves around contestation for power during and after elections and recurrent attempted coups. Ethnic and religious rivalries, as well as socio-economic crisis, further intensify the ongoing political grievances throughout the country. In addition, Chad is surrounded by conflicts from neighboring countries. Conflict dynamics in these neighboring countries exacerbates internal crises in Chad, making the conflict-prone country vulnerable to both national and regional instabilities.

Causes of the conflict 

• Centralization  of power

President Déby has dominated Chadian politics since ascending to power in 1990. He overwhelmingly won elections in 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 despite alleged electoral irregularities and successive opposition boycotts. Moreover, the fact that members of the Zaghawa ethnic group from the north, who are a demographic minority, have been in control of Chad’s military, political and economic systems since the 1990s has created a serious discontent among most people.

• Spillover from Conflicts in Neighboring Countries

Chad’s geo-strategic location makes the country subject to cross-border instability and spillover from conflict dynamics in neighboring countries. Conflicts in Sudan, Libya and the Central African Republic resulted in about 500,000 refugees and displaced persons being relocated to Chad. These refugees place additional pressure on the country’s poor social services and systems. They heighten pressure on scarce resources and exacerbate tensions in the country.

• Socio-Economic Challenges

Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world with about 46.7%5 of the country’s population living below the poverty line. Malnutrition (2.2M ppl.) and food insecurity (3.7M ppl.), as well as limited access to basic services such as health care and education have created seething resentment towards the government. 

Actors

• The government 

The Chadian armed force equally participates in three major anti-terrorist operations thus becoming one of the most respected armies in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions. It is a key contributor to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel. The Chadian army is also the largest troop contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with more than 1,400 soldiers. It is a member to several regional and international organizations such as the UN, OIF, AU, ECCAS and many others. Chad also maintains strong diplomatic ties with countries such as France and the USA.

• Opposition parties

There have been more than 150 opposition parties in Chad since the reintroduction of the multi-party electoral system in 1996. The objective of these opposition parties is to attain national power and put an end to the long standing regime.

Opposition parties have repeatedly boycotted elections, protesting against alleged electoral irregularities and Déby’s continuing tenure.

• The civil society

Since 2014, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), including sector-based pressure groups and campaigners for human rights, democracy and development, have been active in mobilizing street protests to decry living conditions, impunity and President Déby’s continuing grip on power. 

Popular discontent at the rising fuel and cooking gas costs again resulted in prolonged protest in 2018, while January 2020 saw public sector workers strike as economic conditions continued to worsen in the country.

• Non-state armed rebel groups

Chad has experienced the proliferation of rebel groups as a result of armed opposition politics that shaped successive governments in the post-independence era. 

• Boko Haram

The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), faction of Boko Haram which operates in Chad, is engaged in large scale assaults primarily targeting military structures. Boko Haram began to spill over into the borders of Chad in 2014 and violence by the group rapidly escalated in the Lake Chad region throughout 2015, causing the death of hundreds of Chadians.

Conflict dynamics 

Since independence, Chad has experienced recurring instability, periodic violence, civil wars, coup d’états, authoritarianism and weak democratization fuelled by groups competing for political power and access to resources. 

Moreover, legislative elections have been routinely postponed since 2011. In fact, Chad does not hold regular legislative elections, a defining feature of democratic rule, government accountability and political legitimacy.

The struggle for political power also led to the emergence of several rebel groups that have attempted on several occasions to overthrow the government. In February 2008, three rebel groups (UFDD, RFC and FUC) joined forces and launched an attack on N’Djamena and that almost overthrew the government of President Déby. Following the attack, the Chadian government declared a state of emergency and enacted security measures to guard the capital against possible future coup attempt. France’s intervention equally came in support of the Chadian authorities and forced the rebels to retreat. While most Chadians are against coup attempts and condemn the incursions of rebel groups into their territory, many have also criticized the support given by France to the government.

Compounding this is the emergence of insurgency groups particularly in the Lake Chad region where Boko Haram continues to present a security problem. This caused the National Assembly to establish a state of emergency in the Lake region, effectively placing it under military administration in November 2015. Boko Haram’s attack on a Chadian military base at Bohoma in March 2020, however, resulted in the death of 98 Chadian soldiers, the biggest military loss in Chadian history. In response to this military loss, the Chadian armed forces launched a major offensive against Boko Haram in April 2020 leading to the death of at least 1000 Boko Haram fighters.

Current response assessment

• The African Union

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU PSC) called on the government and the opposition to unconditionally renounce the use of force and engage in constructive dialogue aimed at finding a peaceful and lasting solution to the problems facing Chad.

• The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)

As Boko Haram’s activities extended across the Lake Chad Basin Region, concerns over regional security increased pushing countries towards collaborative military engagement. This led to the reactivation of the MNJTF by the LCBC on 30 April 2012 with an additional mandate to encompass counter-terrorism operations. The MNJTF was later given a clearer mandate against Boko Haram on October 7, 2014 at the Extraordinary Summit of LCBC member states and Benin. Formally authorized for deployment by AU PSC on 29 January 2015, the MNJTF had troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin among other countries

• International Partners

France intervened in 2006, 2008 and 2019 to prevent coup attempts in Chad while the UN Security Council issued a statement in May 2009, condemning the military incursions in eastern Chad by armed groups. In addition, the EU Force in Chad (EUFOR) and UN Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) have both concentrated on the protection of civilians in and near refugee camps.

International partners such as the UN, EU, US, France, Britain, China, Canada, Israel and Turkey have also provided financial and humanitarian support, training, military advisors as well as intelligence and surveillance capabilities to the MNJTF. 

Scenarios

• Best case scenario 

The best case scenario would be a peaceful overturn of power through political and institutional reforms that would put in place a controlling mechanism on the executive government and help the promotion of representative government in the legislature as well as independence in the judiciary. This would result in the opening up of political space for increased democratization in Chad and mitigate future conflict with armed groups. It would also lead to the reduction of ethnic and religious tensions that are triggers of violence in many parts of the country. 

Similarly, the decimation and total defeat of Boko Haram in Chad and other countries affected by the group’s insurgency would be a best case scenario. 

• Worst Case Scenario

The worst case scenario for Chad would be an escalation of violence and subsequent collapse of the government as political elites and rebel groups continue to be at odds with each other in trying to secure power. In the case of Boko Haram, the worst case scenario would be the expansion of the Islamist group’s operations to other regions of Chad. Under this worst case scenario, political and economic instability will worsen while on-going humanitarian crisis will deepen.

• Most Likely Scenario

The most likely scenario is the continuation of cyclical internal conflicts. Under this scenario, the country will experience economic crisis, fragile peace and a series of insecurity problems, without necessarily descending into full-scale civil war. It is, therefore, likely that political violence and coup attempts will be recurrent until Chadian opposition groups and rebel groups see alternatives to violent transfer of power. The Chadian government will also continue its campaign against Boko Haram although this may not lead to a total defeat of the group. Boko Haram will likely remain a threat to national and regional security as it will continue to demonstrate its ability to carry out significant terrorist attacks in the Region of the Lake Chad Basin.