Author : Kwame A. Ninsin
Affiliated Organization : Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
Publication Type : Report
Date of publication : 2016
Link for the original document
In the narrower sense they are about the fact that elections give practical expression to the sovereignty of the citizens of Ghana. Both of these perspectives converge where the democratic rights of citizens become central to governance. Our interest lies in both, because underlying both perspectives is the centrality of elections to democracy and the role of citizens as key participants in governance, particularly in the policy-making process where alternative policy choices regarding what is good for society are made.
Political parties have been an integral part of the country’s transition to democratic politics. However, the political party system also went through a similar cycle of rebirth and suppression. Between 1954 and 1957 when the people were struggling for independence from British colonial rule, as many as eight political parties emerged to participate in the independence struggle. Between 1969 and 1972 when the country freed itself from the first military regime, between five and 12 political parties were formed to join hands in the agitation to restore democratic rule in the country.
In 1979 when Ghanaians again embarked on agitations to reclaim their government from the military and place it on the path to democratic rule there was an explosion of political parties: 11 political parties mushroomed. By 1981 the scramble to form political parties had simmered down reducing the number to six which existed at various levels of engagement in the political process until the last and longest military regime truncated the budding democratic process in December 1981 and thereby ended the growth of various governance institutions, and ruled the country until December 1992.
In 1979 when Ghanaians again embarked on agitations to reclaim their government from the military and place it on the path to democratic rule there was an explosion of political parties: 11 political parties mushroomed.
Throughout the transitions to democratic rule, the emergence of political parties was linked to elections through which the core values of democracy were affirmed: namely, political and civil rights as well as social and economic rights.
The 1992 Constitution under which democratic rule was restored guarantees various rights, including political and civil rights such as freedom of political association, speech and self determination. Like their predecessors, the political parties that emerged within the framework of the 1992 Constitution have been driven by the core values of democracy. The country’s history of military dictatorship and abuse of human rights were compelling reasons for insisting especially on the basic political and civil rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution.
Between May 1992, when the ban on political parties was lifted, and November of the same year, 13 political parties were registered in response to the democratic opening, namely,
Democratic People’s Party
New Generation Party
Ghana Democratic Republican Party
National Independence Party
Peoples Heritage Party
Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere Party
National Convention Party
National Democratic Congress
New Patriotic Party
People’s National Convention
People’s Party for Democracy and Development
National Justice Party, and
National Salvation Party
Some of the political parties, for example, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), had emerged from an old political tradition dating back to the 1950s and subscribed to conservative liberalism.
While the number of political parties contesting the parliamentary elections remained more or less stable between, for example, 1996 and 2004, those contesting the presidential elections varied from time to time: three (3) in 1996, seven (7) in 2000 and four (4) in 2004. Clearly the better-organized political parties, which were also the best endowed with funds and other material resources, were the ones that could field candidates in both the parliamentary and presidential elections.
Apart from the NPP and NDC the other political parties could not field candidates in all the constituencies even for the parliamentary elections. This pattern of rise and fall of the political parties has continued into post-2000 electoral politics that further indicates the contrasting financial and organizational capacity of the array of political parties that populates Ghana’s political arena.
Apart from the NPP and NDC the other political parties could not field candidates in all the constituencies even for the parliamentary elections.
In the light of this unstable political history, governance institutions could not develop appropriate rules and procedures that would be rooted in society and in the consciousness of the rank and file of citizens, and ensure general compliance as well as guarantee their longevity and stability. Again, the prevailing institutions could not gain the necessary maturity and embedded principles and norms that would dictate that governance would be in consonance with the general interest and demands for social security and wellbeing. Ghanaian politics in general and electoral politics in particular should be understood within this environment of institutional fragility that above all was underpinned by a weak commitment to an overriding national purpose.
Such euphoria about Ghana’s democratic politics notwithstanding, there is mounting evidence that governance institutions are not working according to global standards. For example, parliament is unable to exercise its oversight functions due to extreme partisanship and gaps in the existing enforcement regime, and political parties cannot perform their integrative and policy articulation functions effectively. They have become instruments for sectarian, ethnic and money politics.
The media do not perform their civic duty by acting as the conscience of the nation and holding government accountable, ensuring transparency, building consensus on national issues through dispassionate and educative journalism, and generally promoting common national values and national unity. They tend to function as instruments for peddling ethnic and partisan division and acrimonious politics in the country. In general they have become complicit in bad governance for purely partisan ends, especially during an election year.
In the light of this unstable political history, governance institutions could not develop appropriate rules and procedures that would be rooted in society and in the consciousness of the rank and file of citizens, and ensure general compliance as well as guarantee their longevity and stability
In their chapter on parliamentary primaries Daddieh and Bob-Milliar recall the claim by theorists of democracy that where the individual party member is able to play a greater role in the internal affairs of the party the party is more democratic, and the more decentralized its procedure the greater the possibilities that its members would be able to play a role in its internal governance.
This claim about citizen participation in the internal processes of political parties is made mandatory by Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution which requires that ‘the internal organization of a political party shall conform to democratic principles’. It may justifiably be argued therefore that the conduct of party primaries that occurs through the decentralized structures of the political parties is in conformity with these principles of participation.
However, as the authors point out, party primaries are only formally democratic. Despite the mass base of the political parties, voting in the primaries is restrictive: only certain categories of party members are allowed to vote. Voters in the primaries are also subjected to a number of extraneous influences, including the exercise of undue influence, imposition of candidates and manipulation of procedures by party officials at the local and national levels despite the existence of ‘explicit formal rules’.
Since 1992 Ghanaian elections have grown in the intensity of competition for parliamentary seats and for executive office, especially as the multiparty system resolved itself into a virtual two-party competition between the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), and also as the margin of victory between the presidential candidates in elections since 2008 became smaller.
There is also the use of money to get candidates to vote in a particular way or for particular candidates. Regarding the latter problem, the authors assert categorically that unregulated use of money in Ghanaian elections could determine the outcome of crucial primaries, and that such palpable trends are the result of growing competitiveness in the race for parliament.
Since 1992 Ghanaian elections have grown in the intensity of competition for parliamentary seats and for executive office, especially as the multiparty system resolved itself into a virtual two-party competition between the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), and also as the margin of victory between the presidential candidates in elections since 2008 became smaller.
In 2008, for example, the victorious presidential candidate of the NDC won by just 50.3 per cent of the votes against the NPP candidate’s 49.7 per cent – a difference of just over 41,000 votes. Furthermore, as Ninsin argues in his chapter on ‘Elections and Representation in Ghana’s Democracy’, ‘the rising level of elite competition for parliamentary seats is due to the prevailing view of elections as a means to control the state for private accumulation …’.
The engagement of political parties in electoral politics is therefore driven by the imperative to win power at all cost. Hence candidates as well as their political parties are wont to employ unorthodox strategies to win, especially the presidential election.
As a winning strategy in an election, the two leading political parties do not hesitate to provoke serious controversy about various aspects of election management, including voter registration, the voters’ register, whether it is credible, the creation of new constituencies and several other issues that could otherwise be settled consensually. Such contestations have had the tendency to undermine the legitimacy of elections as well as the credibility of election results, leading to post-election disputes – for example, in 1992, 2000, 2008 and 2012. Admittedly, those disputes were resolved without undermining the peace and stability of the nation; they nonetheless left a mark of profound anxiety over the prospect for consolidating the country’s democracy.
Maame Gyekye-Jandoh argues in her chapter titled ‘Civic Election Observation and General Elections in Ghana under the Fourth Republic: Enhancing Government Legitimacy and the Democratization Process’ that such threats to Ghana’s democracy have been averted largely through the intervention of civil society organizations which continue to function as election monitors and observers in support of the country’s democratic politics.
She employs the case of the Coalition of Domestic Election Observation (CODEO), which started on a modest scale as a domestic election observer group in 1996. About 18 years later CODEO has grown into a giant and dynamic domestic election observation group capable of conducting election observation without the intervention of foreign observers and monitors. Hence she argues: the Ghanaian experience shows clearly that democracy can be consolidated and democratic reversals pre-empted, when civil society organizations take the initiative to enhance domestic/societal ownership of the electoral process through active observation and monitoring of elections. Success in performing these roles instils credibility and transparency in the electoral process, so that election results would be accepted by all and post-election violence and conflict prevented.
Several of the contributions to this volume allude, however obliquely, to the determinate role played in the electoral choices made by Ghanaian voters. Ayee, for example, postulates that such factors as ethnicity, clientelism and personality of candidates are bound to influence the electorate despite the fact that there is a long tradition in Ghanaian politics whereby political parties publish manifestos on the eve of an election. However, the fact still remains that Ghanaian political parties have not developed the capacity to set the public policy agenda to shape the choices of the electorate at the polls.
According to him, the lack of a public policy agenda exposes the electorate to ‘irrational’ factors in the choices they make at the polls. Ayee concludes: ‘Voters are not always the rational or well informed actors that the doctrine of mandate suggests. Voters are influenced by a range of “irrational” factors such as the personality of the leaders, the public image of the parties, habitual allegiance and social conditioning.’
As stated earlier, the literature on the transition to liberal democratic politics in Africa postulates that free and fair elections, despite the widespread ambiguities and contradictions which characterise them, are central to the process.In this regard, I should recall my earlier argument: ‘The freedom that democracy embodies become manifest during an election: the freedoms of association, choice, speech, movement; the right to participate and differ, the right to peaceful assembly and other latent fundamental human rights are brought alive and exercised by the citizens, including the franchise itself which expresses the fundamental equality of the citizen’.
The value of the right to vote in a democracy lies in its empowerment of citizens to demand the embedded purpose of citizenship that includes the enjoyment of rights and entitlements such as access to quality education and health, employment and a living wage, among others
The quality of the vote or how people perceive their vote is therefore of paramount importance if democratic governance is not to be debased.
The value of the right to vote in a democracy lies in its empowerment of citizens to demand the embedded purpose of citizenship that includes the enjoyment of rights and entitlements such as access to quality education and health, employment and a living wage, among others.
Where a democratically chosen government fails to deliver on these citizenship entitlements citizens have the right to replace it with one that promises to provide them with the opportunities for improved livelihood. In the chapter titled ‘Elections and Representation in Ghana’s Democracy’, Ninsin queries whether the enthusiasm of the Ghanaian electorate to vote in their numbers at each general election is an expression of their sovereign power to choose a government and affect the course of public policy.
He argues that on the contrary the embedded power of accountability in the vote that the Ghanaian electorate are expected to exercise over those they vote for is circumscribed by the logic of patron-client relations and poverty and by the lack of a learning process that enables them to exercise ‘enlightened’ political judgment.
Therefore the electorate ultimately vote for their representatives merely because of the trust that the latter would facilitate the allocation of collective goods in the form of local development in exchange for their vote, and in so doing give the political elite a de facto mandate to use state power to enrich themselves and enhance their status in Ghanaian society. Notwithstanding the patron-clientelist nature of Ghanaian politics, citizens are able use elections to demand some form of development in their communities. Electoral politics, which has been showing a strong tendency towards permanent electoral mobilization, is somehow affected by the imperative to meet the developmental needs of the electorate.
Since the 1992 elections, there have been two transition elections – in 2000 and 2008, during which there was a change of governing parties. In the chapter titled ‘Political transitions, electoral mobilization, and the problem of state capacity’, Ninsin argues that the prevailing weak governance institutions provide just the conducive environment for acrimony and instability during the process of change from one elected government to another.
In the process, the transition process is privatized by the incoming political elite who fashion new rules and procedures to regulate the transition in a manner that will secure their monopoly of power and enable them to effectively marginalize the outgoing faction of the political class. The contending elite factions in the transition process take advantage of the weakness of governance institutions to drag out the process almost indefinitely, and thereby create uncertainty about the future of the political contest.
The pursuit of self-interest does not encourage economic progress which is a necessary requirement for sustainable democratic governance. A sprinkling of elections, however free and fair, on a sea of corruption, economic mismanagement and plutocracy, cannot cure the problem of social and economic backwardness
They assume adversarial positions on almost every issue arising from the transition process. Between the two contending political elites there is no trust, no dialogue and no consensus about the transition process. In the absence of regulatory governance institutions there is a strong tendency to abuse power through various actions and inactions.
The weakness of governance institutions benefits the political elite as a whole; therefore no faction of the political class has the incentive to strengthen the institutions of the democratic state. Where the political environment is volatile, as happens during democratic political transitions, and state institutions are weak the governing political elite is able to engage in wanton corruption and inefficient economic management that adversely affect social development.
Anaman draws a direct link between democratic political transitions and the general state of the economy. He argues that incumbent governments control substantial wealth of the nation to either manage or mismanage the economy.
[In the absence of strong governance institutions] they tend to spend excessively and with impunity, especially during an election year leading to inflation in the immediate post election years. Inflation has adverse effect on corporate, group and personal income; it weakens the domestic currency and ultimately slows down the development of the nation.Overall, in terms of human development, it is observed that election years produce poorer macroeconomic management which is characterized by higher inflation, higher budget deficits, negative balance of payments figures and lower levels of gross international reserves. The poorer macroeconomic management translates into poorer economic conditions of the people and lower quality of human development.
In ‘Democracy without Development: The Perils of Plutocracy in Ghana’ Maxwell Owusu affirms the point made in the preceding paragraphs about the implications of weak governance institutions, which includes the reckless choices public officeholders do make, and the adverse effect these have on democratic politics and on social development. The pathos of public life is that anti-corruption laws are not enforced, and anti-corruption and accountability institutions do not carry out their legal mandate to the hilt. Hence Owusu argues that in the absence of strong institutions the governing elite indulge with impunity in political and administrative dishonesty and corruption.
The pursuit of self-interest does not encourage economic progress which is a necessary requirement for sustainable democratic governance. A sprinkling of elections, however free and fair, on a sea of corruption, economic mismanagement and plutocracy, cannot cure the problem of social and economic backwardness.
According to Owusu, if the political elite would strengthen the governance institutions and replace the politics of self-interest that predominates in public life with the pursuit of the public good there will be prosperity, sustainable growth and development, and democracy will flourish.
Quashigah, in ‘Ghana’s 2008 Elections, The Constitution and the Unexpected: Lessons for the Future’, sums up the thrust of the analyses in the preceding chapters; namely, that institutions do matter, but where institutions are weak operating rules and procedures are easily and wilfully flouted and abused for personal advantage regardless of the consequences for society.
The problem of Ghana’s politics is that its institutions are weak; the 1992 Constitutions did not provide the framework for the functioning of established institutions. This omission is compounded by the political attitude and behaviour of the plutocrats for whom power is a means to the acquisition of wealth and status, and they have shown that they have ample disposition to employ any means to achieve and monopolize it. Hence,
The two main political parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Party (NDC) deliberately manipulated the electoral process and the legislative system to hopefully achieve desired ends. In general so much money is spent on Ghana’s electioneering campaign and related activities that the stakes become extremely high and loss becomes devastating. Consequently everything possible is done to win an election, without regard to its repercussions for the whole democratic process or for the integrity and stability of the nation as a whole.
The experience in Ghana confirms the belief in the need for a complement between the political attitude and the constitutional and statutory aspects. The electoral process in Ghana could benefit from some conscious re-engineering of the timetable for elections as well as a statutorily regulated transitional process
However, unlike Gyekye-Jandoh who postulates that the efficacy of civil society intervention has redeemed the situation from the machinations of the contending political elites, Quashigah argues that the institutional weaknesses and their perverted outcomes are due to human agency: they are ‘more a reflection principally of the determination of political attitude’.
Nonetheless he believes that a change in political attitude and behaviour will correct the institutional lapses and nurture the governance institutions into maturity. This is what Owusu also has to say about the responsibility of the political class in perverting Ghana’s electoral politics: if the political class would strengthen the governance institutions and replace the politics of self-interest that predominates in public life with the pursuit of the public good there will be prosperity, sustainable growth and development, and democracy will flourish.
Nevertheless constitutional provisions could complement political attitude in ensuring a smoother operation of the electoral and transition processes. The experience in Ghana confirms the belief in the need for a complement between the political attitude and the constitutional and statutory aspects. The electoral process in Ghana could benefit from some conscious re-engineering of the timetable for elections as well as a statutorily regulated transitional process.
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