Author: David Mcnair
Affiliated organisation: Carnegie
Site of publication: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Type of publication: Commentary
Date of publication: January 15th, 2022
As diplomats put the final touches on preparations for a joint summit between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) this week, early indications suggest the headline outcomes will disappoint. But what is happening behind the scenes is much more significant.
The Lead up
The sixth EU-AU Summit will happen against a backdrop that places Africa in the center of geopolitics perhaps more than ever before. It’s no secret that China has spent the past decade building influence on the continent through diplomacy and major infrastructure investments. India, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey also are taking an increasing interest in the region. The EU’s recent Global Gateway announcement promising up to 300 billion euros in investment is an attempt to counter this growing influence, as is U.S. President Joe Biden’s Build Back Better World initiative.
On the African side, the backdrop is one of growing anger. The EU’s actions in monopolizing vaccine access during the pandemic and locking out African countries that were ready to pay for doses deepened mistrust and sowed doubt that the EU is a serious partner
In addition, these leaders are beginning to recognize that their ambitions on climate and technology can’t be achieved without Africa, and the risk that instability in parts of the continent could create large volumes of irregular migration are top of mind for European leaders.
On the African side, the backdrop is one of growing anger. The EU’s actions in monopolizing vaccine access during the pandemic and locking out African countries that were ready to pay for doses deepened mistrust and sowed doubt that the EU is a serious partner. The EU’s opposition to a temporary intellectual property waiver for COVID-19 treatments, a travel ban following South Africa’s sequencing of the Omicron variant, and the failure to reach the promised $100 billion in annual funding at the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference rubbed further salt in the wound.
European countries offered fiscal stimulus of 26.4 percent of GDP to bolster their own economies, while offering a tepid response to support African countries with aid and debt relief.
The past two years have further bolstered the narrative that Africa should no longer rely on the West and must pursue its own strategic autonomy. This builds on renewed self-confidence among African leaders in implementing the new African Continental Free Trade Area, an open skies agreement, plans for investment in a pan-African university accreditation scheme, and high-speed rail infrastructure—all part of Agenda 2063, Africa’s master plan for transforming the continent into a global powerhouse of the future.
All of this makes for an interesting time to reset relations between the two continents, separated at their closest point by just 14 kilometers between Morocco and Spain.
The summit
Intensive negotiations between EU and AU representatives on the official outcome followed the conclusion of the AU summit earlier this month. But insider discussions suggest AU representatives will be disappointed by what’s on offer from the EU.
Some in African civil society argued that—if Africa were considered as a region, as the EU often is—its economics, if not its demographics, should warrant the AU a permanent seat in the G20. The upcoming IMF governance review should address the fact that just two of the organization’s twenty-four executive directors represent forty-six African countries.
So while there are big ideas on the table, African ambassadors, frustrated by the glacial speed of progress, aren’t expecting much from the Brussels meetings. The AU’s Permanent Representatives Committee deleted the word “alliance” in earlier versions of the summit text
Others want to expose the hypocrisy of European efforts to limit investment in natural gas in Africa as a transition fuel, while Germany continues to invest in the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, and the EU included liquified petroleum gas in its taxonomy of sustainable energy sources.
Africa, which imports 99 percent of the vaccines it uses, is prioritizing investment in manufacturing capacity. Sharing of technology and intellectual property will be essential to making progress, but a proposed waiver on medicines for COVID-19 remains unlikely, despite the support of more than 100 countries, as Germany is strongly opposed.
So while there are big ideas on the table, African ambassadors, frustrated by the glacial speed of progress, aren’t expecting much from the Brussels meetings. The AU’s Permanent Representatives Committee deleted the word “alliance” in earlier versions of the summit text. Some African states are taking the summit less seriously because they perceive the process—chaired by France and Senegal—to be a Franco-Afrique summit. Africa’s Anglophone and Lusophone states were not invited to preparatory talks, fueling the impression that their interests will not be represented. Key among these concerns is the perception that France is using the summit to pursue its own diplomatic interests in the Sahel region and is seeking to loosen normative commitments to working within the AU on peace and security cooperation.
The likely outcome
This summit will not herald a new partnership of equals or even significant policy and financial commitments. The damage done to trust and diplomatic relations during the pandemic, and likely confusion over what is actually being added to existing commitments, won’t afford that.
However, in an era of fragmentation, this is a highly ambitious effort toward a multilateral agreement between two regions totalling 82 countries with a population of 1.75 billion. That’s no small feat, and if it isn’t a resounding success, there are good reasons.
Perhaps the most significant outcome will be a realization that Africa is demanding to be treated as a serious partner, not an aid recipient. It might be too late for this summit, but that message has been heard loud and clear in Brussels.
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